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Abstract 
 
When people attempt to recall their pre-feedback estimation of a general knowledge question, 
they are often biased toward the feedback. This is portrayed as hindsight bias (HB) memory 
distortion type. The current study is a theory-driven exploratory research that aims to discover 
the fundamental underlying mechanisms of such bias. Experiment 1 and 2 confirm and verify 
the appropriate interference task and depletion procedure used for the main experiments. 
Experiment 3 applies the depletion procedure on the HB memory paradigm and finds a 
descriptive increasing trend of HB after depletion. Experiment 4 combines the labeling effect 
(within-subjects manipulation) and depletion procedure on HB and further confirms the result 
of experiment 3. A single-dissociation pattern of HB magnitude after depletion with different 
labeling conditions is obtained, indicating a dynamic dual-process mechanism underlying HB, 
with knowledge-updating behavior and interference resistance action as the two controlled 
and flexible processes yielding HB. Results of HB are obtained from both traditional 
inference analyses and the multinomial modeling analyses. Comparisons are discussed 
demonstrating the superiority of the latter analyzing method applying HB. 
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Opening Words 
 
From the moment I sit down to begin writing this dissertation, I am compelled to grapple with 
one of the most robust judgment-phenomena in Cognitive Psychology –	the topic this 
dissertation focuses on –	hindsight bias. I need to be conscious of hindsight bias throughout 
the writing process to ensure I provide sufficient explanation of concepts to readers who have 
limited prior knowledge of hindsight bias or Cognitive Psychology. This means not only 
deciding which material I should include in this dissertation, but also determining the extent 
to which I introduce and elaborate on specific points, ever conscious that as a writer I risk 
being “blindfolded”	by the knowledge I already possess on subject matter my readers may be 
less familiar with. 
 
Even being hyper-aware of this robust phenomenon, one finds it difficult to avoid falling into 
its traps. My aim is to manage the conundrum of hindsight bias, writing up this dissertation 
with every pertinent explanation while not burdening the reader with unnecessary detail and 
redundant information.  
 
12 May 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7		 	
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1.  Hindsight Bias (HB) fundamental introduction 
 
The concept 
Hindsight Bias is among the most fascinating topics examined in Cognitive Psychology over 
the past three decades, since Fischhoff (1975) first conducted a study revealing an 
over-estimation of what people knew about events before receiving knowledge of the 
outcome of those events. Two meta-analysis studies of HB have also contributed to the 
literature in the field (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, 
& Posavac, 2004). In everyday life, we often find ourselves using phrases such as “I knew it”	
or “I told you so”	to those around us, whether they be friends, colleagues or partners. 
However, we typically do so without considering the possibility that we may in fact be 
experiencing an intriguing social and cognitive phenomenon –	hindsight bias. The robustness 
of this phenomenon has garnered attention from psychologists in all areas from cognitive to 
economic. The concept may be observed in various eras, cultures and religions; it has been 
elaborated in Buddhist, Sanskrit and in Tibetan texts. In contemporary Western society, this 
bias is displayed in a multiplicity of milieu from legal decisions (Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995; 
Harley, 2007) and medical diagnoses (Arkes, Wortman, Saville, & Harkness, 1981; Arkes, 
2013) to decisions in economic contexts (Zwick, Pieter, & Baumgartner, 1995) and in 
psychological attitudes such as paranormal beliefs (Kane, Core, & Hunt, 2010).  
 
Although what we may colloquially call a “knew it all along”	experience has been deemed the 
same fundamental phenomenon expressed in varied contexts, Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & 
Fischer (2008) argue that HB is not a unitary concept. They distinguish between three types 
of HB in the literature, each manifesting itself at different levels. These three types are 
impression of necessity (behavioral level); impression of foreseeability (affective level) and 
memory distortion (cognitive level). This core idea of this dissertation deals with the latter 
type of HB –	memory distortion	–	on a cognitive level.  
 
The main aim of this dissertation is to explore the fundamental underlying cognitive processes 
of HB. In introduction part, an overview to the relating aspects of HB is given, e.g., the 
plausibility effect of HB, the developmental findings. With respect to the statistical research 
method, both traditional HB measures and the relatively more recent multinomial processing 
models elaborated by Erdfelder and Buchner (1998) are represented since both methods are 
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used in this dissertation. Then already existing theories and models of HB are reviewed, 
following which purpose and hypotheses of the current study are introduced. Then the 
empirical part of this study is presented with reporting and discussing 4 experiments. General 
concepts and theories about HB are firstly introduced in the next following sections.   
 
The task and the design 
All three types of HB can be tested experimentally in different task designs. Pohl (2007) 
summarizes the two main schemas employed in the literature: memory design and 
hypothetical design. 
 
In the hypothetical design, subjects are given a question; they are then asked what they would 
have given as their estimating answer while simultaneously being presented with the correct 
answer to the question. The entire procedure is conducted within one experimental session 
without any retention interval. Conversely, in the memory design, subjects are given a 
question and asked for their first estimating answer; either immediately or after a certain 
retention interval, the correct answer is presented to them. In the final stage, subjects are 
required to recall their initial answer. Unlike the hypothetical design, there is a time delay 
involved; hence memory processes are relevant in the memory design. Subjects are 
susceptible in both designs to become biased by the outcome answer of the question when 
giving their own hypothetical answer or when trying to recall their initial estimation. 
Examples of both designs are demonstrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Examples of Hypothetical Design and Memory Design of HB Task 
 Hypothetical design	 Memory design	
Question	 How high is the Mannheimer Watertower?	 How high is the Mannheimer Watertower?	
First Estimation	 (absent)	 82 m	
Retention Interval	 (absent)	 (present or absent)	
Correct Answer	 (later presented)	 60 m	
Retention Interval	 (absent)	 (present or absent)	
Test	 The correct answer is 60m. 
What would you have guessed?	 What was your answer initially?	
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In both designs, different materials can be applied. The most commonly used materials for the 
memory distortion type of HB has been numerical stimuli, which are tested by general 
knowledge questions (or almanac questions) (e.g., Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Müller, 
1988; Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoffrage, 1997; Bayen, Erdfelder, Bearden, & Lozito, 2006). 
The examples given in Table 1 belong to the category of numerical memory. Another 
stimulus type for memory design of HB examines ‘event outcome probability’, using forced 
choice questions to obtain a subject’s level of confidence that they have offered correct 
answers (Winman, Juslin, & Bjorkman, 1998). For instance, Fischhoff (1977) provided 
participants with a fact (e.g., that the story of Aladdin originated in Persia rather than China) 
after initially asking them to choose between two alternatives. Participants showed HB by 
reporting a higher confident memory about the correct answer than they had had prior to 
learning about it. In addition, there are also findings of HB in the form of behaviour 
knowledge and action intentions (Pieters, Baumgartner, & Bagozzi, 2006). Empirical studies 
employing the memory design have typically been conducted within subjects, whereas those 
using hypothetical design have been carried out between subjects. Although both designs 
measure the extent to which the post-outcome judgment is biased toward the feedback, there 
may be different underlying mechanisms involved. Researchers have also differed in their 
findings with regard to cultural variance of HB in hypothetical design and memory design 
(see Choi & Nisbett, 2000; Heine & Lehman, 1996 and Pohl, Bender, & Lachmann, 2002). 
Thus, it is necessary to differentiate between the two HB designs. Hertwig et al. (1997) 
contend the designs have discrete terminologies. They argue the term Hindsight Bias should 
only be applied in memory design, whilst knew-it-all-along should be used in hypothetical 
design. I shall adopt this differentiation for the current study; as I use only memory design in 
this work, all subsequent discussion concerns memory design exclusively, with hypothetical 
design being put aside. 
 
In more recent studies, HB has been confirmed within the domain of visual perception. 
Harley, Carlsen, & Loftus (2004) showed evidence of participants overestimating the level of 
visual degradation at which they or a naïve peer are able to recognize visual targets, 
demonstrating HB through their own knowledge of target identity (using celebrity faces as 
stimuli). Similarly, Bernstein, Atance, Loftus & Meltzoff (2004) and Bernstein, Atance, 
Meltzoff & Loftus (2007) provided empirical evidence among both children (3-5 year olds) 
and adults that overestimation exists when they are asked to predict their own or a naïve 
peer’s ability to identify a visual object that had been previously presented to them.  
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Moreover, short text stories and videos have also been used as materials to test the 
foreseeability component of HB (Fessel, Epstude, & Roese, 2009). This stream of research 
not only indicates that HB is a very robust phenomenon (e.g., in Harley et al., 2004) that is 
not effectively reduced by explicit instructions to avoid the bias, but also tells us that HB can 
be displayed in various modalities rather than simply being an intellectually involved concept. 
These pronounced characteristics of HB have triggered numerous empirical studies in the last 
four decades; using different methods of measurement and manipulations, this varied work 
has sought to uncover the underlying mechanism(s). In the next two sub-sessions, 
methodological issues pertaining to HB research will be discussed.  
 
How to measure HB? 
In the literature of memory HB, 3 methods have been applied to measure the magnitude of 
HB with continuous responses. Hell et al. (1988) first proposed to quantify HB as a 
percentage in the form of the Hell-Index: HB = 100 (OJ	–	ROJ)/(OJ	–	CJ), with OJ denoting 
the numerical value of the Original Judgment, ROJ denoting the numerical value of Recall of 
Original Judgment, CJ denoting the numerical value of the Correct Judgment (these 
abbreviations will be used henceforth). Excluding perfectly recalled items, the Hell-Index 
calculates the percentage of HB with a range of normal HB from 0% to 100% (higher values 
indicating a larger bias).  
 
A negative value indicates that ROJ is further removed from the CJ than the OJ is. Values 
larger than 100% indicate that ROJs are on the opposite side of the CJs to the OJs. The 
advantage of the Hell-Index is that it is not dependent on the absolute values of the unit used, 
or of the numerical distance between the OJ and CJ. However, there are also cases of HB that 
the Hell-Index cannot detect. For example, when the mean of OJ in a memory design is the 
same as the CJ of that item, the mean of ROJ would likely also equal CJ; in this instance, HB 
would be zero using the Hell-Index computation. However, when looking at individual 
responses, there may in fact be more ROJs moving toward the CJ, indicating the existence of 
HB that cannot be detected using Hell-Index and the response’s mean of OJ and ROJ. Thus, 
in this case individual responses must be used instead of the mean response with Hell-Index 
computation. Another problem with the Hell-Index concerns extreme values. For instance, 
when OJ is much closer to CJ than the ROJ is (i.e., ROJ is much further away from both OJ 
and CJ), the HB magnitude would in turn be extremely large. To overcome this problem 
embedded in Hell-Index calculation, extreme data points must be excluded; alternatively, 
median (instead of mean) HB values can be used. 
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A more elegant response to deficiencies in the Hell-Index became available with the 
introduction of the Proximity Index (HBprox.) (Fischer & Budescu, 1995; Pohl, 1992). 
  
HBprox. = | OJ-CJ | - | ROJ-CJ | 
 
The Proximity Index is 0 when ROJ is the same as OJ, indicating an absence of HB. A 
positive Proximity Index occurs when ROJ is closer to CJ than OJ is. If ROJ is further away 
from the CJ than OJ is, then the Proximity Index is negative. In empirical studies, 
standardized values (z values) are employed to enable comparison between HB items using 
different units and between experiments using different HB items (Pohl, 1992, 2007; Pohl & 
Hell, 1996). Thus,  
Δz = | zOJ - zCJ | - | zROJ - zCJ | 
The techniques described above represent the conventional methods of measuring HB. 
However, they carry with them both methodological and theoretical drawbacks (Pohl, 1995). 
Methodologically, there is a regression tendency in that the ROJ tends toward the mean of the 
OJ. If a CJ happens to be close to the mean of OJ, this regression effect can lead to HB. By 
including a control group that is given the same HB items without CJ presentation, we are 
able to obtain a comparison with the experimental group (with CJ presentation). In turn, the 
true magnitude of HB can be derived. Even with this solution applied, conventional methods 
of measuring HB cannot distinguish whether the ROJ results from direct recall from memory, 
a reconstruction of the estimation process or even a pure guessing process. In light of this, 
Erdfelder & Buchner (1998) constructed a multinomial-processing model that separates 
different processes that may lead to the final ROJ. The next section describes this model. 
 
Erdfelder & Buchner (1998)’s HB-13 model 
Besides the general analysis technique, Erdfelder, 2000 and Erdfelder & Buchner (1998) 
apply the stochastic model analysis for HB data –	the multinomial processing tree (MPT) 
model. As we have seen, traditional descriptive and inference statistics are not sophisticated 
enough to differentiate the underlying processes of HB, rendering them unable to reveal 
which specific process is influenced in different situations. 
  
The MPT models provide insight into cognitive processes that are not readily seen via 
analysis of the observable frequencies of different categorical events. Until the 1980s, MPT 
models were rather underused. However, since the study undertaken by Riefer & Batchelder 
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(1988), MPT models have been widely adopted in areas of cognitive psychology concerned 
with dimensions of cognitive phenomena; for a review, see Erdfelder et al., (2009). However, 
MPT models only explain categorical data, requiring for example yes/no or correct/false 
responses. Our HB memory paradigm yields continuous data requiring numerical judgments. 
Erdfelder & Buchner (1998) solved this dilemma by sorting the HB memory task data into 10 
categories according to the magnitude of OJ, CJ and ROJ (for a detailed order of categories 
see Appendix). Subsequent to this, their HB-13 model has been extensively used in a range of 
HB empirical studies (e.g., Bayen, Erdfelder, Bearden & Lozito, 2006).  
 
The assumption of the HB-13 model is that participants in a HB task would first try to directly 
recall their initial judgments. Only when they fail do they then engage in a reconstruction 
action (Hoffrage et al., 2000). The 10 possible categories of responding orders are based on 
this reconstruction. For example, if the OJ of the question “How high is the Eiffel Tower?”	is 
“280m”, after being presented with the CJ (324m), participants may give a ROJ (320m) that is 
clearly biased toward the CJ. This response would then fall into the order category of OJ 
<ROJ<CJ. The frequencies of each order category are then calculated for later analyses, with 
cases of correct OJs being disregarded. The parameters denoting different underlying 
processes can then be estimated through the raw categorical data; the estimations 
consequently indicate the occurrence probability of each process. There are 13 parameters in 
Erdfelder & Buchner (1998)’s HB MPT model (listed in Table 2). The main HB-13 model 
parameters that are critical for most typical HB studies are rC, rE	–	denoting the probability of 
successful recollection in control and experimental conditions, respectively; and parameter b 
measuring the probability of a biased reconstruction in experimental conditions. It should be 
noted that the parameter c adopted for the current study based on Pohl, Bayen, & Martin 
(2010)’s study characterizes a different psychological interpretation to Erdfelder & Buchner 
(1998)’s classic HB-13 model (explanation of which is given in later tree description).  
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Table 2 
HB-13 Model parameters and their Psychological Interpretations 
Parameter	 Interpretation 	
rC, rE	 Probability of recalling the OJs for control and experimental items,  
respectively.	
b	 Probability of a biased reconstruction given a failed recall of the OJs.	
c	 Probability of adopting the CJs.	
h	 Probability of a chance hit of the OJs or the CJs in case of unbiased 
reconstructions. 	
gl1, gg1, gl2, gg2	 Parameters denoting the ROJ distribution in case of unbiased reconstructions 
without chance hits (for OJ < CJ and OJ > CJ, respectively).	
gl3, gg3	 Parameters denoting the ROJ distribution in case of biased reconstructions  
without CJ adoption (for OJ < CJ and OJ > CJ, respectively).	
lC, lE	 Probability of OJ < CJ for control and experimental items, respectively.	
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Figure 1. The HB-13 multinomial processing tree model by Erdfelder and Buchner (1998) for HB 
memory paradigm. A: Processing tree for control items. B: Processing tree for experimental items. For 
parameter interpretations see Table 2. The italicized OJ, CJ and ROJ represent the corresponding 
numerical values. From “Decomposing the hindsight bias: A multinomial processing tree model for 
separating recollection and reconstruction in hindsight”	by E. Erdfelder and A. Buchner, 1998, Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 24, p. 392. Copyright 1998 by the 
American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. 
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Figure 1A illustrates the model tree of the processes and the resulting rank order categories of 
the control condition when no feedback is presented. When participants are asked for their 
OJs they have the probability of lC to underestimate CJ, giving an OJ that is lower than CJ, 
consequently generating the upper part of the control tree. The lower portion of the tree 
describes the state of an overestimation of the CJ (i.e., giving an OJ that is higher than CJ), 
with the complementary probability 1 –	lC . Later when participants are asked for their ROJs, 
they have a probability of rC to correctly recall their OJs, leading to the rank order ROJ = OJ < 
CJ. When this direct recall fails, with a probability of 1 –	rC , participants may engage in a 
reconstruction action that is not biased with control items due to the absence of CJ 
presentation. The unbiased reconstruction may generate a result of ROJ with a chance of 
hitting either the OJ or the CJ (with the probability of h for each possibility), or with no 
chance to hit OJ and CJ (with the complementary probability of 1 –	2h). With the no 
chance-hit path, ROJs are obtained through a guessing process, with a probability of gl1 
generating a ROJ that is lower than CJ. The complementary probability 1 –	gl1 thus denotes 
the distribution of a higher ROJ than CJ, eventually resulting in the rank order of OJ < CJ < 
ROJ. The lower ROJ compared with CJ could be either even lower than their OJ, with a 
probability of gl2; or higher than OJ, with the complementary probability 1 –	gl2. The lower 
part of the tree is a mirrored version of the upper tree section, and thus follows the same logic. 
 
Figure1B represents the processing of experimental items wherein CJs are presented to 
participants. The tree structure mirrors the tree for control items (Figure 1A) apart from the 
involvement of the CJ influence on the reconstruction process. More specifically, the 
corresponding parameters are lE and rE with the experimental items lC and rC with the control 
items described above. In the situation of a failed direct recall of the OJ, the reconstruction 
process may then be biased by the CJ, with a probability b. The biased process may either 
take the path of falsely adopting the CJ as their OJ, with a probability of c; or the path with no 
such mistaken adoption, this having the complementary probability 1 –	c. Note that in this 
study, I adopted parameter c (CJ adoption) as in Pohl et al. (2010) instead of parameter s 
(source confusion) as in Erdfelder & Buchner (1998) classic HB-13 model. In the current 
study, CJ and ROJ are presented on the same screen and at the same time. Thus, CJ adoption 
is more adaptable than source confusion. Subsequently, if the biased reconstruction process 
occurs with no adoption of the CJ as OJ, participants are to subsequently engage in a guessing 
process to generate a ROJ that is either in between the OJ and CJ with a probability of gl3, or 
biased toward and higher than CJ, with a complementary probability 1 –	gl3. The lower part of 
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the tree for experimental items is once more the mirrored version of the upper tree section, as 
with the control items. The model equations are obtained by adding all probability branches 
(i.e., by multiplying the probabilities within one branch) that lead to the same rank order of a 
tree.  
 
The estimations of the parameters can be obtained from the rank order frequencies via 
maximum-likelihood estimation (Hu & Batchelder, 1994). The validity of the model’s 
assumptions is tested via the goodness-of-fit tests indicated by the likelihood ratio chi-square 
statistics G2 (Hu & Batchelder, 1994).  
 
The recollection bias can be tested through a comparison between the parameter estimations 
rC and rE. If the null hypothesis rC = rE is supported, then memory for OJs is not influenced by 
the CJ presentation, indicating an absence of recollection bias. If however rC > rE, memory for 
OJs is then impaired by the CJ presentation, thus reflecting the presence of recollection bias.  
The HB-13 model by Erdfelder & Buchner (1998) has been successfully applied to many 
empirical HB studies. They conducted and presented 4 such successful experimental 
examples in their own paper for developing and validating the model. In almost all previous 
studies concerning HB memory paradigm, the model met the criteria of goodness-of-fit with 
parameter estimations being satisfactorily consistent with the hypotheses of corresponding 
manipulations. The current study also employed the multinomial processing models to 
analyse HB data. As described above, only a small modification was made comparing to 
Erdfelder and Buchner (1998)’s classic HB-13 model. That is, CJ adoption (parameter c) 
instead of source confusion (parameter s) was used, due to the simultaneous presentation of 
CJ during ROJ task. Thus, the CJ presentation timing here is also an influential issue of 
memory design of HB, which is discussed in the next session.   
 
The way OJ CJ ROJ are presented 
The critical element here is CJ presentation timing. In the empirical studies, CJ is either 
presented after OJ, during ROJ or before ROJ. The study by Hell et al. (1988) falls in the first 
and the third category at the same time. In fact, time of CJ presentation was one of the 
manipulating variables in their study. Subjects were given OJs of almanac questions in the 
first session. They were then asked to write down an exact numerical estimate for each 
question. In the same session, having completed all questions, subjects were given the second 
booklet with CJs of half of the questions (i.e., CJ immediately after OJ). One week later, at 
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the second session, the same subjects were given a booklet with CJs of the other half of the 
questions. Immediately afterwards, the same 88 questions used in the OJ phase were 
presented and subjects’	ROJs were obtained (i.e., CJ immediately before ROJ). The results of 
this work showed that time of CJ presentation was a significant manipulating factor. HB 
increased when CJ was presented later at the second session (i.e., immediately before ROJ).  
 
Bayen et al. (2006) however, presented the CJs during the ROJ phase in their Experiment 1. 
For half of the items, the CJs were presented at the same time as corresponding questions, 
subjects being asked simultaneously to give their ROJs. These were served as experimental 
items, as opposed to control items with no CJ presentation. An experimental example would 
follow this form:  
In what year was the Monkey Wrench invented? 
The Monkey Wrench was invented in 1841. 
What was your original answer? 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the effect of presenting CJ was significant despite the relatively 
irregular timing of presentation. 
 
In their second experiment, Bayen et al. (2006) presented CJs immediately before ROJs rather 
than simultaneously with ROJs. The manipulation of whether or not CJ was presented in the 
physical retrieval environment was designed to examine the hypothesis that knowledge of CJ 
in working memory is able to yield significant HB; furthermore, this second experiment 
tested the age difference found in Experiment 1. In addition, they encouraged subjects to 
encode CJs deeply in their working memory by giving them a recollection of CJ task (RCJ). 
Results supported their hypothesis that HB was present, this being demonstrated by the 
comparison of HB index between experimental (with CJ) and control (no CJ) groups. In 
regard to age difference, results remain significant as with Experiment 1, indicating that older 
adults showed larger HB than younger adults did. Thus, they concluded that increased 
hindsight bias among older adults was not due to the salient physical presence of CJ in the 
retrieval environment.  
 
While the retention interval between CJ presentation and ROJ attempt was short in Bayen et 
al. (2006)’s Experiment 2, i.e., immediate condition, they added a delay condition wherein 
subjects were required to carefully “read and study”	CJs that were presented one at a time for 
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6 seconds. CJs are less accessible for older adults compared with younger adults as CJs are 
retrieved via the delay condition from long-term memory, which is evidently more difficult 
for older adults (Smith, 1996). As a result, they hypothesized that given the delay condition, 
older adults should not have significantly larger HB than younger adults, and perhaps even 
have smaller HB (i.e., a reduced or reversed age difference in reconstruction bias).  
 
Although CJ presentation timing varies in previous empirical work, no cross comparison has 
been done to systematically examine the effect of when and how CJ is presented across all 
manipulations. This omission is largely due to the interactive influence of other factors on 
HB, for example the type and design of HB tasks used or the retention interval between the 
OJ and ROJ phase, etc. However, researchers did manipulate CJ presentation timing to test 
conflicting theories. As discussed above in regard to the Hell et al. (1988) example, keeping 
the time between OJ and ROJ constant varied the CJ presenting time to either immediately 
after OJ or immediately before ROJ. According to Fischhoff (1975)’s assimilation theory of 
HB, about the same amount of HB should occur under these two conditions, as the 
assimilation is supposed to be immediate and a stable memory trace is made when CJ is 
presented (i.e., immediate assimilation), irrespective of when this presentation occurs. 
However, if this assimilation is supposed to gradually increase with longer coexistent time of 
OJ and CJ memory traces, then HB should be larger in the earlier CJ presentation condition. 
Conversely, if this assimilation is supposed to gradually decrease (or decay) over longer 
periods of these two memory traces, then a larger HB should be seen with the later CJ 
presentation condition. Their results supported the decay theory. It should be noted however 
that this immediate assimilation theory is only one among various theories explaining HB, 
particularly the almanac question HB task. Hell and colleagues’	(1996) results could also be 
explained by other HB theories, for example inhibition theory; that is, that later CJ 
presentation made the correct information more salient and harder for subjects to inhibit 
during ROJ, thus eliciting larger HB.  
 
Differing theoretical approaches to explaining HB will be explored in the next section. Before 
discussing these theories, I shall turn to typical applications of HB in recent literature. 
 
Applications 
HB has been applied in domains ranging from scientific study to the activities of daily life 
(Henriksen & Kaplan, 2003). Berlin (2000) presented a malpractice case in radiology and 
discussed the critical influence of HB in such situations. In recent research on applications of 
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HB, Arkes (2013) presented the involvement and importance of HB in medical malpractice. 
Researchers have also given attention to the detrimental effects of HB in legal 
decision-making situations (Harley, 2007). More specifically, the robustness of HB has 
presented a difficult challenge for jurors tasked with ignoring the negative outcomes of a 
given crime in order to consider a defendant’s actions in a fair manner. In such cases HB is 
considered to be more detrimental than beneficial in terms of reaching just and desirable 
outcomes. Thus, exploring how HB could be eliminated has been the main focus of 
discussion.  
 
However, in other domains, HB could be considered benign or even valuable. Hölzl & 
Kirchler (2005) studied HB in an economic development environment, demonstrating that 
euro supporters were more hindsight biased for positive developments than for negative ones, 
while euro opponents showed the opposite pattern. The authors therefore argued that people 
are highly motivated to re-judge the current situation using new information supporting their 
attitudes, in turn serving to stabilize their subjective belief systems. Other positive 
consequences of HB were discussed in Tykocinski, Pick, & Kedmi (2002). Participants in 
their study showed more HB when outcomes were undesirable or unfavorable, such that in 
retrospect the outcome seemed almost inevitable. Through this retroactive pessimism, people 
could regulate their disappointment after events. Louie (1999) and Louie, Rajan, & Sibley 
(2007) also observed benefits as a result of HB, but from an inverse perspective to the above. 
They argued that HB possesses a self-serving function in that it is present in favorable 
outcomes (e.g., “I knew I would succeed”) and absent with unfavorable outcomes (e.g., “My 
idea should have worked”) in self-involving events. Through this asymmetric pattern, people 
could accept credit for favorable outcomes and deny blame for unfavorable outcomes. The 
inconsistency of these two arguments could be caused by whether or not a given setting or 
context led to personal behavior, i.e., the extent of self-relevance to the event.  
 
In summary, HB has profound practical implications in an array of domains, both 
experimental and real-life; indeed, some of the latter being crucial to people’s lives, e.g., in 
forming legal decisions and in medical diagnoses. It is thus important to study and understand 
the underlying mechanisms of HB for both scientific and practical purposes. 
 
Developmental findings on HB 
As with many other pervasive cognitive phenomena, researchers have been interested in 
developmental trends associated with HB. While most studies have been conducted among 
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younger adults (predominantly university students), Bayen et al. (2006) were the first 
researchers investigating HB in older adults. Using almanac questions, they found no 
consistent form of age effect. The first two experiments exhibited larger HB in older adults 
compared with younger adults. In their 3rd experiment, no such difference was found. The 
authors argued that in Exp.1 & 2, participants were given an instruction to encode CJ, thus CJ 
was present in working memory. Older adults find it more difficult to suppress CJ as 
task-irrelevant information during ROJ, leading to larger HB. In Exp.3, not only was there no 
instruction to encode CJ, it also appeared minutes before ROJ. Under such conditions, CJ had 
to be retrieved from long-term memory to interfere with ROJ. Because older adults have 
relative difficulty in retrieval, leading to an equally exhibited “intact”	function with regard to 
inhibiting CJ’s access to working memory, no difference in HB task performance was found 
vis-à-vis their younger counterparts. 
 
Further developmental study of HB has been conducted with children of different age groups. 
Smith's (1999) Experiment 2 could be seen as an anchoring design of the HB paradigm. In 
that experiment, third graders, fifth graders and college students were asked to estimate the 
number of jellybeans in a glass container after they were given a question sheet asking 
whether there were more or fewer than either 50 (low anchor group) or 250 (high anchor 
group) jellybeans in the container. While results showed an anchoring effect, no age 
difference was found in the extent of this effect. Due to material limitations, HB studies have 
not commonly been conducted with children.  
 
Bernstein et al. (2004) developed a visual HB paradigm that can be easily conducted with 
pre-school children as well as adults. Participants were asked when a naïve peer would 
identify a drawing that gradually becomes more defined on a computer screen, under the 
condition that they either knew what object the drawing was (baseline condition) or they did 
not know (hindsight condition). Only when different objects were used in these two 
conditions was a declining age effect found such that adults showed smaller HB than their 
pre-school counterparts. When the same objects were used in both baseline and hindsight 
conditions, this age effect of HB disappeared. The authors did not offer any specific 
explanation for this disappearance of age effect. We may only infer that the declined HB in 
adults compared with younger children found in their Exp.1 was not sufficiently robust to be 
replicated in Exp.2.  
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Pohl & Haracic (2005) used a hypothetical design with almanac questions as materials 
investigating HB in fourth, sixth and eighth graders and in university students. They did find 
an age effect indicated by a significant anchor x age interaction; however, the effect size was 
relatively small (f 2 = 0.03, 1-ß	= .70). 
 
The more recent developmental study on HB was conducted with 9-year olds, 12-year olds 
and adults (Pohl et al., 2010). They compared the results obtained from traditional variance of 
analyses methods (ANOVAs) with results using the multinomial modeling analyses 
specifically tailored for HB (i.e., the HB-13 model by Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998). While the 
ANOVAs detected no difference in the shift measure of HB across each of the three age 
groups, the multinomial modeling analyses showed that only 9-year olds exhibited high 
recollection bias and more adoption of the feedback. 
 
Most recently, Coolin, Bernstein, Thornton and Thornton (2014) compared young adults in 
their HB occurrence and magnitude with older adults. Age effect in general was confirmed in 
both aspects of HB. That is, older adults were more often to show HB than young adults.  
Moreover, HB magnitude was larger in older adults than in younger adults. More importantly, 
Coolin et al (2014) argued that whether HB occurred was dependent on participants’ episodic 
memory and inhibition. However, these two cognitive variables did not predict how big HB 
was once it occurred. Regarding how could episodic memory and inhibition accounted for the 
age differences in these two aspects of HB, no answer was drawn due to the limitations of the 
research method. Nonetheless, inhibition was proposed to be critical in decrease of HB of 
older adults. Further study by Coolin, Erdfelder, Bernstein, Thornton and Thornton (2014) 
incorporated several cognitive covariates proved to be critical to HB into the core parameter 
estimation process on the basis of the classic HB13 model (Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998). The 
results indicated that while recollection bias of HB was influenced by three cognitive factors – 
episodic memory, working memory capacity and inhibition; reconstruction bias was mostly 
and only dependent on inhibition, but not on the other two factors. Although this pattern of 
individual differences were only found in their study with older adults, but not with younger 
adults, the importance of inhibition was again affirmed. Gross and Bayen (2015) further 
approved this notion. They found that the typical increase of HB in older adults compared 
with their younger counterparts disappeared when a longer retention interval (RI) was inserted 
in the HB task. In their study, young adults with a long RI performed even worse in recalling 
their OJs than older adults did. However, these young adults did not show a higher 
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reconstruction bias than older adults. This was most probably due to their better inhibitory 
control ability that avoided ROJ was more biased by CJ. This finding further strengthened the 
important role of inhibition might play in memory paradigm of HB. 
 
In general, the developmental findings have been rather mixed revealing several 
methodological problems. First, the experimental designs differ substantially. Some adopted 
an anchoring design, whereas others used hypothetical design and memory design, presented 
either by text questions or visual tasks. Although the main focus has been on the HB concept, 
disparate cognitive underlying mechanisms could be involved given the different 
experimental design and presentation formats. Second, most of the studies discussed above 
analyzed data using the traditional statistical method (ANOVAs). As such, apart from the age 
difference in HB at large, very little in the way of further results capturing the detailed 
processes underlying HB was obtained. In current HB literature, only five studies have 
utilized the MPT method to analyze developmental data, namely the above-mentioned Bayen 
et al. (2006), Coolin et al. (2015), Groß & Bayen (2015), Pohl & Haracic (2005) and Pohl et 
al. (2010). The former three studies compared HB of older adults and younger adults while 
the latter two compared children and younger adults. With the more sophisticated MPT 
analysis, these five studies suggested a U-shape developmental trajectory of HB, with 
younger adults being in the middle demonstrating the smallest degree of HB compared with 
children and older adults. The researchers explain this U-shape trajectory with cognitive aging 
account; more specifically, the inhibition-related function deficit with older adults and 
children. Moreover, there is also indirect evidence suggesting the relationship between HB 
and inhibition-related functions, e.g., the interaction between inhibitory control and children’s 
eyewitness memory (Roberts & Powell, 2005), which is considered to operate within a similar 
paradigm to the memory type HB. However, the direct correlation between inhibition-related 
ability and HB was found not to be significant (Exp.1 in Bernstein et al., 2007; Pohl, 2008). 
There could be several explanations for the non-significant correlation between HB and 
inhibition. First, the correlational design is not powerful enough to find the relationship. 
Further, the low reliability of HB tasks using almanac questions may lead to the 
non-significant findings in a correlational study (Musch & Wagner, 2007). Thus, the current 
study employs a more powerful experimental design (for more detail see the method section). 
Second, in Bernstein et al (2007)’s correlational study, a visual HB task was used, instead of 
the memory text-based HB task in both Bayen et al (2006)’s and Pohl & Haracic’s (2005) 
studies. The third reason, which is perhaps the most plausible and worthy of further 
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investigation, is that apart from inhibition, there could be other essential cognitive 
mechanisms or processes involved in the HB paradigm. The current study is thus devoted to 
discovering the more fundamental underlying mechanisms. Before considering the current 
study in detail, other theories and models explaining HB in the literature will be summarized 
in the next section.  
 
 
1.2. Theories and models explaining HB 
 
In general 
HB has been broadly demonstrated in retrospective tasks. However, these tasks may differ in 
a variety of aspects (see Pohl, 2004, 2007 for a review). First, there are different ways that the 
relevant information is presented. Some tasks having required participants to give true or false 
for statements (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Wood, 1978; Pohl, Stahlberg, & Frey, 1999; Musch, 
2003) while others have used 2-alternative-forced-choice (2AFC) questions (Fischhoff, 1977; 
Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). An example of the latter would be “Is absinthe (a) a 
liqueur or (b) a precious stone?" (Fischhoff, 1977). Participants are required to select the 
correct definition of the word absinthe and then give a confidence rating showing how 
confident they are in their choice. In my current study, I am only concerned with HB tasks 
that require exact numeric responses as presented above in the Task session.  
 
Pohl (2007) argued that different types of HB task could lead to subjects using different 
processes to make their initial judgments or estimates. For example, the cognitive processes 
involved in the almanac question task for subjects to formulate their numeric estimates may 
be of a different order to the processes in the confidence-rating task in which metacognitive 
assessment is engaged (see also Ash, 2009). Even with the same type of HB task, the almanac 
trivia question being an example, Hertwig et al (1997) argued that different cognitive 
processes might be involved in different designs (hypothetical vs. memory, discussed earlier) 
of the same almanac question task. In fact, they suggested the term hindsight bias only for 
memory design and knew-it-all-along effect for hypothetical design.  
 
Moreover, the nature of the feedback a person receives also varies. The anchoring design used 
in Smith (1999)’s Experiment 2, for example, involves the estimation of the number of 
jellybeans in a jar. Although this task shares a many similarities with the almanac general 
knowledge question, the nature of subsequently presented information is different. In the HB 
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task of current study, information presented later is the correct answer of the question. Thus, 
subjects have a greater tendency to learn about this information than in the 
jellybean-anchoring task, which resembles more a pure retroactive interference paradigm.  
 
In sum, when considering theories explaining HB, any given theory should only be used to 
explain a specific and defined type of HB as there are different processes involved in every 
stage of each type of HB (Blank, Musch, & Pohl, 2007). The current study limits its focus to 
memory design using numeric almanac trivia question tasks and comparison between 
subjects. Thus, the metacognitive lines of particular theories (e.g., expectation- and 
experience-based adjustment theories by Ash, 2009; Pezzo, 2003; Renner, 2003; Sanna & 
Schwarz, 2007) will not be included for discussion in this dissertation. Moreover, subjective 
attitudes and causal attributions do not figure in the “cold material”	of the current study, being 
relevant only to more applied situations, e.g., economics (Hölzl & Kirchler, 2005; Pezzo & 
Beckstead, 2008). Now I shall turn the attention to the main streams of theory explaining the 
HB task in this study.  
 
Cognitive reconstruction theories 
Cognitive reconstruction theories suggest that people tend to re-estimate the question when 
asked for their previous judgment, after having failed to directly access their initial estimation 
in episodic memory (Stahlberg, 1994; Stahlberg & Maass, 1997). The critical outcome 
information conceivably exerts its effect in both the access failure of OJ and the re-estimation 
process. The memory trace of OJ could be destroyed or disturbed, which makes it harder for 
subjects to directly recall their OJ in episodic memory. Thus, the re-estimation process is 
engaged; however, this process is influenced by the existence of outcome information leading 
to a deviation from their initial judgment (Guilbault et al., 2004).  
 
The Anchoring and adjustment notion also falls into the category of cognitive reconstruction 
theory. This notion proposes that the outcome information acts as an anchor for people to 
reconstruct their initial judgment. They give their retrospective judgment adjusting away from 
this anchor through heuristic cues.  
 
The updating and re-judging notion asserts that the outcome information updates the very 
knowledge-base upon which an individual’s re-judgment is based (for a review, see Hawkins 
& Hastie, 1990). Automatic association theory by Fischhoff (1975), for instance, suggests that 
the presentation of outcome information induces an automatic assimilation with the existing 
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knowledge units. Therefore, the later re-judgment produces a deviated ROJ based on the 
changed knowledge units.  
 
Both lines of theory contend that there is a reconstruction stage when people are asked for 
their previous estimation of a question or a situation. There is little agreement however on 
when and how the outcome information applies its effect. Both theoretically and empirically, 
researchers have differed as to: 1) whether or not the outcome information erases the OJ 
memory trace and if yes, to what extent. That is, whether the memory traces of OJ and CJ 
co-exist, rather independently, or if the latter blends in the former (Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff 
& Beyth, 1975; Hell et al., 1988; Pohl, Eisenhauer, & Hardt, 2003). Thus, in turn, 2) in the 
ROJ process, whether people tend to engage in resisting the interference of CJ as they try to 
directly access OJ; or they instead attempt to reconstruct their initial estimation (Ash, 2009) 
and the re-judgment is deviated by the outcome information. While the former is empirically 
supported by developmental studies in HB (discussed earlier), the latter finds evidence in 
same age studies. It should be noted, however, that there may be no absolute answer for the 
discrepancy. Instead, due to the high variance of HB tasks, some strands of theory explain 
certain situations better, while simultaneously failing to account for other situations. More 
specifically, whether or not the memory trace of OJ and CJ is rather independent or merging 
could be dependent on several conditions: CJ presentation timing or subject characteristics 
(e.g., learning-motivated or indifferent; expert or layman in the task material; age, etc.). 
Erdfelder & Buchner (1998) postulate an account reconciling the second argumentation, i.e., 
HB could be explained by both recollection bias and reconstruction bias (see also Erdfelder, 
Brandt, & Bröder, 2007). 
 
Recollection bias and Reconstruction bias 
The typical result of the numeric memory HB task is that subjects give some correct ROJs 
that are identical to their OJs. However, the percentage of correct ROJs is lower when 
outcome information is presented (as in the experimental condition) than when no outcome 
information is presented (as in the control condition). Heuristically, subjects first engage in 
direct recall of their OJ from memory when asked what they have answered previously. 
Failure in this process leads to a reconstruction. As it is unclear whether these correct OJs are 
due to a successful direct recall, matching results of re-judgment, or perhaps simply guessing, 
the presentation of outcome information could exert its influence on the memory of OJ 
resulting in less successful direct recall; or on the re-judging process resulting in unmatched 
ROJ. Erdfelder & Buchner (1998) postulate that two forms of biases build up HB, the 
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recollection bias (when CJ presentation affects the direct recall process) and the 
reconstruction bias (when the re-judging process is impacted). Thus, previous theories 
explaining HB could be categorized as being one of these two types (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Accounts Explaining HB Based on Recollection Biases and Reconstruction Biases 
Recollection bias could be due to -	
  
CJ altering the OJ memory by	 destroying the OJ memory completely by assimilation, or	
adding to OJ memory so that both 
OJ and CJ co-exist	
Retrieval barrier of the OJ due to CJ	  
Reconstruction bias could be due to -	
 Anchoring and adjustment	  
Re-judgment based on stronger accessibility of CJ-congruent 
information	  
Reconstruction based on the updated knowledge after CJ presentation 
(e.g., sense-making theory, Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007).	  
Reconstruction based on the influenced 
metacognitive inference of 	 the feeling about the answer, or	
the feeling about one’s ability in a 
certain knowledge domain	
 
 
 
Empirically, some studies support only the reconstruction bias view that OJ memory is not 
impaired by CJ (Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003, Exp.1); whilst others argue that recollection bias 
and reconstruction bias work together in a graduated fashion, rather than all-or nothing 
(Pieters et al., 2006). Moreover, as demonstrated in Table 2, recollection bias and 
reconstruction bias should be viewed as types of biases in HB or components of HB, and are 
not detailed explanations of HB. Thus, researchers began to construct more systematic models 
to explain HB. The most influential ones are: the Selective Activation, Reconstruction and 
Anchoring (SARA) model (Eisenhauer, 2000; Pohl et al., 2003), the Reconstruction After 
Feedback with Taking the best (RAFT) model (Hoffrage et al., 2000; Hertwig, Fanselow, & 
Hoffrage, 2003) and Causal Model Theory (CMT) (Blank & Nestler, 2006; Blank & Nestler, 
2007; Nestler, 2007). However, only two of these (SARA and RAFT) concern the memory 
paradigm of HB. Furthermore, only SARA attempts to explain HB generated by way of 
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almanac questions requiring numerical judgment. Thus, I will only discuss the SARA model 
in detail. 
 
Selective Activation, Reconstruction, and Anchoring (SARA) 
The SARA model (Eisenhauer, 2000; Pohl et al., 2003) systematically elucidates rather 
detailed cognitive processes incorporating the two types of HB discussed above. SARA 
(based on the memory model SAM: Search of Associative Memory, Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 
1980) assumes that people possess a network consisting of associative image sets which they 
attach to certain knowledge. Concerning the typical memory HB paradigm, the relevant 
associative image sets (e.g., a, b, c, d, &e) are chosen to generate OJ. When CJ is presented, 
the image sets that are more congruent to the correct answer (e.g., c, d, &e) are selectively 
strengthened. Later in the ROJ phase, these strengthened image sets are thus more activated, 
leading to a biased ROJ toward CJ. Moreover, SARA proposes that CJ could also induce a 
biased sampling by acting as a cue that facilitates the access to the adjacent image sets. SARA 
not only clarifies HB theoretically, but the model also successfully simulates the recollected 
judgment in empirical studies (Pohl et al., 2003).  
 
Despite the success of SARA both on a theoretical level and in terms of empirical prediction, 
the model has limitations, specifically in the selective strengthen phase when feedback is 
presented. SARA implies that this selectivity is merely at the objective level wherein only 
feedback-congruent image sets are strengthened. This fails to observe the subjective level in 
which only plausible feedback could provoke this strengthening process. Although the 
theoretical model overlooks this subject level, it has often been demonstrated in empirical 
studies as the plausibility of feedback information.  
 
Plausibility effect in HB 
Researchers have attempted to eliminate HB magnitude by discrediting feedback information 
or manipulating the plausibility of feedback. Findings have been mixed in both HB and other 
similar anchoring effect literature. Hasher, Attig, & Alba (1981) failed to discredit feedback 
information in their Exp.1. Strack & Mussweiler (1997) found no difference in the anchoring 
effect when both implausible and plausible anchors were presented. What is more, no 
elimination of HB was found when the feedback was labeled as “another person’s estimate” 
and values that were incorrect by a large margin were provided as feedback in Pohl (1998). In 
contrast, successful discrediting can be found in Choi & Choi (2010), Erdfelder & Buchner 
(1998) Exp.3, Hardt & Pohl (2003), Hasher et al. (1981) Exp.2 and Wassermann, Lempert & 
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Hastie, 1991). This inconsistency could in large part be due to 1) the mixed type of anchoring 
or HB tasks used, and 2) the level of the manipulation (implicit vs. explicit). Concerning the 
first point, a large body of research on HB plausibility effect has focused on the event 
probability aspect (for a review see Choi & Choi, 2010). Moreover, Hasher et al. (1981) used 
a true-false stating task and successfully discredited the feedback information in their Exp.2. 
Others used factual knowledge questions requiring absolute numeric judgment (Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997; Pohl, 1981; Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998 and Hardt & Pohl, 2003). 
Regarding the level of the manipulation, almost all feedback discrediting was only 
manipulated at a rather implicit level, i.e., feedback information was presented as an anchor 
exerted by answering a comparative question (e.g., whether Brandenburg Gate is taller or 
shorter than 150m) (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Although highly incorrect values were 
provided as feedback, Pohl (1998) labeled the values as “another person’s estimate”	instead of 
“false”. Only two cases explicitly told participants that the presented feedback was wrong 
(Exp.2 in Hasher et al., 1981 and Exp.3 in Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998).  
 
Taken together, when feedback information is presented in a rather explicit manner (instead 
of an implicit exertion) in an almanac question task, the plausibility of the feedback does have 
a significant effect on HB.  
 
The SARA model assumes feedback information strengthens the congruent image sets, 
regardless of its plausibility. It therefore lacks an evaluation phase that would allow for 
selective strengthening (at the subjective level). With such an evaluation phase, only plausible 
feedback could be encoded leading to a strengthening of congruent image sets. When, 
however, implausible feedback is presented, the evaluation process could initiate an inhibition 
activity that blocks the strengthening. The “kicking-in” of the inhibition process is also highly 
consistent with the developmental findings of HB discussed above. Notwithstanding this, as 
stated in the section “developmental findings on HB”, previous studies have failed to 
establish a direct correlation between inhibition and HB. The puzzle now is thus: it is highly 
probably that inhibition functions are involved in the HB memory paradigm, this despite the 
fact they have not been observed in empirical studies. The primary aim of this study is to 
solve this problem using a more powerful experimental manipulation: depletion procedure. 
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1.3. The current study 
 
Why this study? 
Despite fruitful findings in previous studies of HB, we lack a systematic theory to explain the 
primary lines of results stemming from them, these being the developmental trajectory and 
the rather stable and robust plausibility effect (again keeping in mind that in this study, only 
memory design using factual knowledge questions requiring absolute numeric judgment is 
under consideration). Moreover, there has been considerable debate concerning whether HB 
is an automatic process that is part of our evolutionary heritage or a controlled process. More 
specifically, if it is automatic, how could this automaticity be involved? And if it is 
controlled, what particular cognitive function plays an important role? To sum up, the present 
picture forming around memory HB can be described as: 
• A U-shaped developmental trajectory 
• Difficulty in preventing HB from occurrence, even under overt warning to avoid the 
bias 
• Implausible feedback resulting in clear reduction of HB 
• No direct evidence of a significant correlation between inhibition and HB 
As discussed, no previous theory or model can reasonably clarify these quite incongruous 
fragments of evidence. Therefore, further investigation using a different manipulation is 
necessary to give genesis to more progressive theory, one which might help us to better 
understand the underlying mechanisms of this robust phenomenon. 
 
Introduction to the current study and hypotheses 
I intend to apply a depletion procedure on the memory paradigm of HB. Based on previous 
findings and suggestions, this depletion procedure will not be on general cognitive resource, 
but on a related specific cognitive function: inhibition. In order to be more targeted, it is first 
necessary to establish an appropriate depletion task for the current study. In prior work 
examining the relationship between inhibition and HB, different types of inhibition tasks have 
been used. Bernstein et al. (2007) applied two different inhibitory control tasks: Day/Night 
and Bear/Dragon tasks (Carlson & Moses, 2001). Pohl (1998) and Pohl, Auer, Bayen, & 
Martin (in prep.) used a battery of inhibition tasks, such as word recall (testing proactive 
interference), a pattern comparison task, an embedded figures test and stroop tasks (digit 
count and color words) to examine the correlation between inhibition and HB. They found 
significant correlations for some of the inhibitory tests, e.g., the pattern comparison task and 
embedded figures test. Bernstein et al. (2007) chose inhibition tasks so that their requirements 
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were similar to theory of mind tasks, with which they intended to investigate the relationship 
with inhibition. Likewise, however, they failed to find a relationship between inhibition and 
HB in one of their two experiments, most probably because they ignored whether these 
inhibition tasks are similar in nature to HB tasks. Thus, I shall select inhibition tasks for the 
depletion procedure ensuring they are related in nature to the memory HB paradigm of current 
study. Reviewing the inhibition literature, the classic retroactive interference design (by 
Müller & Pilzecker, 1900, cited in Anderson & Neely, 1996) is chosen as the best candidate 
for the inhibition tasks for 2 reasons, as follows: 
1. The core structure of this design is based on the paired-associate methodology to test 
the interfering effect of learning new information on recalling previously-learned 
materials. This is very similar in nature to the current HB memory task.  
2. Previous findings of significant correlation between children’s retroactive inhibition 
skills and similar cognitive paradigm (eyewitness memory) (Roberts & Powell, 2005). 
 
 
For the current study, a slightly modified AB-AD task is applied to further suit the current HB 
memory task (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the modified AB-AD task based on Müller & Pilzecker (1900)’s classic 
retroactive interference design. 
Control condition	
Experimental condition	
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As shown in Figure 2 which illustrates how semantic questions are presented and numeric 
answers are required in the current HB task, I shall change word-word pairs to word-number 
pairs. Moreover, empirically, the length of the word pairs in each study list is crucial in order 
to yield an appropriate amount of retroactive interference; of additional benefit, participants 
will not be fatigued by an protracted list. Taking into account these methodological factors, 
Experiment 1 aims to develop the best combination of characteristics of the AB-AD task for 
the purpose of the current study. In turn, Experiment 2 applies the depletion procedure to 
ensure that retroactive inhibition can indeed be depleted after intensive similar 
inhibition-related tasks, and to validate operative tasks used for the depletion procedure. 
Subsequently, in experiment 3, this effective depletion procedure will be applied on top of the 
HB task to discern whether the critical underlying process of HB is indeed retroactive 
interference resistance. The core logic behind this methodology is based on the notion of ego 
depletion (R F Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998); that is, if two tasks share a 
common specific cognitive resource, then intensive performance of one task (interference 
tasks in the current study) should deteriorate the performance of the task succeeding it (HB 
memory task in the current study). Surprisingly, the results of experiment 3 are contrary to my 
expectation. According to the results of experiment 3, I introduced a new manipulation of HB 
design in experiment 4, that is, CJ is labeled either as “correct answer” or “wrong answer” of 
the question. Combining this labeling manipulation with the depletion procedure, experiment 
4 aims to find out the more specific underlying cognitive processes, apart from the single 
interference resistance explanation. That is, both knowledge updating behavior and 
interference resistance ability are involved to decide the magnitude of HB.   
 
 
Hypotheses 
1. Regarding Experiment 1, participants should perform significantly worse in the 
experimental condition, wherein high retroactive interference is involved by studying 
list 2 (the same words paired with different numbers), compared with the control 
condition. Moreover, the best length of word-number pairs in one list would be 
confirmed for further use. 
2. Regarding Experiment 2, participants should perform significantly worse in the 
AB-AD task after having engaged intensively in interference tasks in which similar 
cognitive processes are involved and high interference resolution ability is demanded 
(i.e., only with the high interference condition). In contrast, no such depletion effect 
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should occur after having done tasks that demand minimal interference resolution 
ability (i.e., only with low interference condition). 
3. Regarding Experiment 3, HB should be significantly larger after depletion of 
retroactive interference resistance ability. There should be no such increase after 
having performed same number of tasks that require minimal interference resolution 
ability. 
4. Regarding Experiment 4, there should be a plausibility effect in which HB is 
significantly larger when CJ is labeled as “correct answer” as opposed to when it is 
labeled as “wrong answer”. After depletion, HB should be significantly decreased in 
the “correct answer” labeling condition, as the knowledge-updating behavior would be 
exhausted via depletion. In contrast, HB should be significantly increased after 
depletion in “wrong answer” labeling condition, because the interference resistance 
ability is depleted. 
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2. Experiments 
 
Experiment 1 
 
In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a paired-associate ABAD task consisting of 
either 3, 4 or of 5 word-number pairs. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants for all experiments in the current study were recruited from the University of 
Mannheim. They were paid either 12 Euro or a 1.5-hour credit to complete their Bachelor of 
Psychology course. A total of 75 students participated, of which thirteen were male. The 
participants ranged in age from 17 to 29 years (M = 20.57, SD = 2.33). All participants were 
native German speakers.  
 
Design  
The design was a 2 (interference level) x 3 (length of the word-number pairs within one list) x 
3 (task order) mixed factorial design with interference level (high-interference or 
experimental vs. low-interference or control conditions) and length of word-number pairs (3, 
4 or 5) as two within-subject variables and task order (presented with 3,4 or 5 pairs first) as a 
between-subjects variable. The dependent variables were the participants’ response accuracy 
and time. 
 
Materials 
All materials in the current study were presented via computer. As mentioned, a modified 
AB-AD task (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900, cited in Anderson & Neely, 1996) was used (Figure 
1). Each AB-AD task consists of an experimental (i.e., high interference) condition and a 
control (i.e., low interference) condition, with 3, 4 or 5 word-number pairs in each list. Words 
were chosen from commonly used nouns with 4 or 5 letters. They words were paired with 3 
digit numbers, for example, 633, 277 or 844, so that 1) there could be more variations than 
using 1 or 2 digit numbers; and 2) participants were required to make some effort to 
remember them (being more difficult than single digit numbers); meanwhile 3) being easier to 
recall than entirely random 3 digit numbers, this level of effort would not over-occupy 
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participants’	cognitive resource, thereby prompting fatigue. In addition, a figure comparison 
task (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991) was applied to fill in the time gap between learning a list 
and recollecting a list in the control condition due to the absence of the second study list. This 
filling task (see Figure 1 control condition) was designed to be rather easy to complete so that 
minimal cognitive resources were demanded. 
 
Procedure 
All participants in the current study were tested in a seminar room with 2 computers. 
E-PRIME software was used for all experiments (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh). 
Participants were asked to sign a consent form at the beginning of all experiments in this 
study. They were then given instructions about the experiment they were to take part in. 
Practice trials were then presented to help them understand the main task.  
 
In Exp.1, participants were randomly assigned into three groups, and began with a study list 
consisting of either 3, 4 or 5 word-number pairs. Participants in each group completed 4 
blocks of AB-AD tasks, with 10 trials of the figure comparison task carried out as refreshing 
tasks in between. Each block consisted of 4 sets of variations. Each variation comprised all 3 
types of AB-AD task starting with different numbers of study pairs (3, 4 or 5). The variations 
were partly counterbalanced in the sense that only 4 combinations (3.4.5; 4.3.5; 5.4.3; and 
3.5.4) were included. Thus, apart from the practice trials, each participant completed 48 
AB-AD tasks and 174 trials of figure comparison tasks.  
 
Figure 3 shows the detailed procedure within each AB-AD task. Each slide was displayed on 
the screen for 2 seconds, except for the fixation point slides, response slides and the figure 
comparison task slides. The latter two types were presented until participants typed in their 
responses; in the case of the figure comparison task however, a warning to speed up was 
presented after 5 seconds of each trial to ensure the total duration of the filling task was no 
longer than the time taken to study list 2 in the experimental condition. The whole experiment 
session took approximately 70 minutes with some variation depending on individual pace. 
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Figure 3. Procedure of one trial of AB-AD task. 
 
 
Results  
 
To minimize the effect of extreme values on the distribution, medians instead of means for 
each participant were computed for all experiments in this study. I also report the partial 
eta-squared (η2) and Cohen’s d as measures of effect size where appropriate (Cohen, 1988).  
For the final data analyses of Experiment 1, data from 2 participants were excluded due to too 
much missing data. For the remaining data from 73 participants, analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) were conducted. I set the confidence alpha level (α) to .01 for the significant tests 
of all experiments unless noted otherwise. As stated above, both response accuracy 
(percentage of the correct recollection) and response time (mms) were analyzed via 
ANOVAs. Results showed that there was no significant main effect of task order both in 
response accuracy (starting with 3 pairs M = 38.32, starting with 4 pairs M = 38.93, starting 
with 5 pairs M = 39.52) and in response time (M3 = 3159,48, M4 = 3089,44, M5 = 3226,44). 
Thus, I merged the data from all 3 groups and conducted a 2 (interference condition: high vs. 
low) x 3 (length: 3, 4 vs. 5 word pairs) ANOVA. My interest here focused upon the 
interaction of these two variables; specifically, which length of word-number pairs could 
yield the largest interference effect. Results showed a significant length by interference 
interaction in response accuracy only with the 5 word-pairs condition, F (2, 61) = 4.83, p < 
.01, partial η2 =.073 (see Figure 4a). Further paired sample t-test showed that participants’	
response accuracy was significantly lower in the high interference condition than in the low 
interference condition with word-number pairs being 5 within one list, t (63) = 3.15, p < .01, d 
= .40. In terms of response time, no factor had a main effect or exhibited interaction of 
significance, F (2, 61) = .324, p = .724, partial η2 =.005 (see Figure 4b). However, further 
paired sample t-test showed that when there were 5 word-number pairs within one study list, 
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response time was significantly shorter in the low interference condition than that in the high 
interference condition, t (63) = 1.62, p < .05, d = .20. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Response accuracy (a) and response time (b) of the AB-AD task in high 
(experimental) and low interference (control) condition with 3, 4 or 5 word-number pairs 
within one study list of Exp.1. Error bars indicate 99% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The main purpose of Exp.1 was to implement the modified AB-AD task and ensure the 
replication of the interference effect while applying the modifications discussed previously. 
Moreover, the number of pairs within one list eliciting the most significant interference effect 
would be detected. The current results successfully replicated the interference effect with the 
number of pairs within one study list being 5. When there were 3 or 4 word-number pairs in 
one study list, participants’	recollection performance of the first list did not differ whether 
there was a second list to study or not. However, 5 word-number pairs within one study list 
could yield a significant interference effect by way of recollection of the first list when there 
was a second list to study. Participants successfully recalled substantially more numbers from 
study list 1 when there was no need to study a second list. Moreover, in regard to response 
time, significantly more time was needed to recall the first list when there was a second list to 
study (see Figure 4). In light of these findings, I decided to include 5 word-number pairs for 
the AB-AD task in subsequent experiments.  
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Experiment 2 
 
In Exp.2, the depletion procedure was examined to ensure its effectiveness before the 
manipulation was applied on HB. I tailored the depletion procedure based on the ego 
depletion notion of Baumeister et al. (1998) and the depletion technique used by (Jonas 
Persson, Welsh, Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 2007).  
 
Ego Depletion 
Baumeister et al. (1998) asserts that a limited resource may be involved in some cognitive 
activities; and that a prior use of such resource may result in a reduced amount of cognitive 
strength in subsequent activities. Muraven & Baumeister (2000) further argue that the 
executive functions –	in particular inhibition-related ones –	consume a limited cognitive 
resource. Employing tasks demanding inhibition ability may have a detrimental impact on 
succeeding inhibition tasks. More research on ego depletion revealed 3 critical characteristics 
that should not be overlooked. First, this reduction of cognitive resources following prior use 
does not last long. It is instead temporary and can be replenished (Baumeister, Gailliot, 
DeWall, & Oaten, 2006). Baumeister and colleagues made an apt comparison to illustrate 
this, suggesting that cognitive resource resembles muscle in as much as ego depletion, as with 
muscle, becomes tired after initial exertion (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Gailliot, Plant, 
Butz, & Baumeister, 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). As with muscle fatigue, 
performance of subsequent tasks can deteriorate. Second, this reduction acts only on 
controlled activities that require active guidance in terms of self-control, but not on simpler 
activities in which no engagement of cognitive resource is demanded (Schmeichel, Vohs, & 
Baumeister, 2003). Third, this reduction is not likely to be general; that is, it cannot be 
transferred to any type of cognitive ability. Rather, the performance decrement after prior 
exertion is specifically applicable to types of cognitive behaviour within the same category as 
the prior behaviour (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).  
 
Depletion technique used by Persson et al. (2007) 
Persson et al. (2007)’s study is a good example of the 3 points discussed above. They 
conducted 3 experiments on depletion of inhibition-related tasks and revealed a 
process-specific fatigue. More specifically, they argued and demonstrated empirically that if 
two tasks share a common type of cognitive resource that is limited, then intensive exertion of 
one task within one experimental session (i.e., training task, used during depletion procedure) 
should temporarily deteriorate the performance of a second task (i.e., transfer task, used for 
39		 	
 
pre and post-test of the depletion effect) requiring the same cognitive resource that was 
depleted by prior use. In contrast, no such transfer effect after depletion should be observed if 
the transfer task and training task rely on functionally different and neutrally separate 
underlying mechanisms. In their Exp.1 and 3, the training task (letter recognition task) and the 
transfer task (verb generation task) involve a common specific cognitive process (interference 
resolution ability), thus revealing the negative transfer effect. Their Exp.2 however used a 
training task (stop signal task) that entails a distinct cognitive process (response inhibition) 
with the transfer task (verb generation task), thus showing no such transfer effect after 
depletion. 
 
In Exp.2, I adopted the same depletion procedure used in Persson et al. (2007) and applied 
selected tasks from their study and Persson & Reuter-Lorenz's (2008) study. The latter is also 
a training study on inhibition-related abilities, but taking the other direction, i.e., regular 
exercise of a specific cognitive ability could enhance performance of tasks entailing the same 
cognitive ability. Detail of the procedure and tasks will be discussed in the method session 
below.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 51 students participated in Exp.2. Thirteen were male. The participants ranged in 
age from 19 to 27 years (M = 21.53, SD = 2.05). Four were non-native German speakers. 
They were paid either 8 Euro or a 1-hour credit toward the completion of their Bachelor of 
Psychology course.  
 
Design  
The design was a 2 (interference level) x 2 (group or depletion intensity) x 2 (time) mixed 
factorial design with interference level (high-interference or experimental vs. low-interference 
or control conditions) and depletion intensity (high vs. low depletion) as two 
between-subjects variables and time (pre vs. post-depletion) as a within-subjects variable. The 
dependent variables were response accuracy and response time of correct responses. 
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Materials 
Three types of tasks were applied in this experiment, these being a transfer task, a training 
task and a filling task. The modified AB-AD task validated in Exp.1 was used as the transfer 
task. As in the Exp.1, a figure comparison task was used as the filling task. The training tasks 
during the depletion procedure were a verb generation task, a letter recognition task and the 
N-back task used in Persson et al. (2007) and Persson & Reuter-Lorenz (2008). All tasks 
could be manipulated to create a high interference condition and a low interference condition.  
 
In the verb generation task (Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997), 
participants were presented with a noun on a computer screen and were required to silently 
generate a verb that functions appropriately with that noun. In the high interference condition, 
the nouns could be connected to many different verbs (e.g., Ball –	spielen, hüpfen, werfen 
etc.); as a dominant verb commonly associated with the noun is lacking, in order to choose a 
verb the high interference resistance ability is demanded. In contrast, in the low interference 
condition, the nouns are primarily partnered with a single, typically related verb (e.g., Schere 
–	schnitten), thus conferring minimal interference resistance ability. The nouns in Exp.2 were 
from Persson et al. (2007)’s study and were translated into German. 
 
In the letter recognition task (a verbal working memory task, Persson et al., 2007), 
participants were first briefly presented with 4 letters. A ‘yes’ or ‘no’ recognition response 
was then required to indicate whether a subsequent probe letter appearing onscreen was 
among the 4 letters. In the high interference condition, the probe letter was not from the 
current set, but from the previous (two) trials. Participants had to resist the interference 
elicited due to the familiarity of seeing it in previous trials, and to reject it by giving a ‘no’ 
response. In the low interference condition, the negative probe letter was not present in at 
least the previous two trials, thus requiring minimal interference resistance process. 
 
In the N-back task (Persson & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008), participants were asked to press the left 
mouse button as quickly and accurately as possible when a word matched one of the n words 
presented earlier (n = 3 or 1). The words were presented on the computer screen at a rate of 3 
seconds per word, with an additional 3-second interval between 2 adjoining words. I slightly 
modified the N-back task used in Persson & Reuter-Lorenz (2008)’s study. For the current 
Exp.2, sixty-four words were presented in total. Among all these words, half matched the 
previous item presented 3 items earlier (target words) while half did not (non-target words). 
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In the high interference condition, the non-target words were intermixed with other non-target 
words that were presented 2, 4 or 5 items earlier (but not 3 earlier, as per the target words). 
Thus, this intermixing yielded a high interference effect to be resisted due to the recent 
exposure of the non-target words. In the low interference condition, participants were simply 
required to indicate whether or not a word was repeated (i.e., n = 1), and thus minimal 
interference existed in this condition. 
 
Procedure 
There were 3 phases in Exp.2: pre-depletion, depletion and post-depletion, with training tasks 
applied during the intermediate depletion phase and transfer tasks used in the pre and 
post-depletion phases. The schematic depiction of Exp.2 is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Schematic depiction of the procedure of Exp.2. From left to right, with tasks applied 
pre-depletion, during depletion and post-depletion. The first and second rows illustrate the high 
depletion group and low depletion group respectively. 
 
 
The whole experiment session took approximately 60 minutes. The transfer task (AB-AD 
task) was performed during the first and last 15 minutes, with the intermediate depletion 
phase (approx. 30min) presenting the training tasks. Participants were given instructions at 
the beginning of each task. Practice trials were presented before the data collection of each 
task. Throughout the entire experiment I did not inform participants about the interference 
manipulations of both the transfer task and the training tasks. 
 
Transfer Task 
The detailed procedure of the transfer task (AB-AD task) is the same as in Exp.1.  
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Training Tasks 
I adopted the procedure from Persson et al. (2007)’s study and Persson & Reuter-Lorenz 
(2008)’s study, with fewer trials of each task. A total of 160 trials of all 3 training tasks were 
performed, taking approximately 30 minutes.  
 
In the letter recognition task, 32 trials were divided into two 16 trial blocks with a 1min rest 
period between blocks. At the beginning of each trial, four lowercase letters (target set) and a 
central fixation point were presented onscreen for 1.5 seconds, followed by a 3-second delay 
with only a fixation point appearing on the screen. A probe letter (uppercase) was then 
presented for 1.5 seconds. Participants were required to respond “yes”	when the probe letter 
was a member of the target set of the current trial by pressing the left mouse button. 
Otherwise, the right mouse button was pressed to indicate a mismatch, and thus a “no”	
response. The inter-trial interval was 1.5 seconds, and no more than 2 successive trials 
required the same response; this was in order to avoid contaminating results from 
lazy-button-pressing participants. The total time for the letter recognition task was 
approximately 8 minutes.  
 
A detailed description of the N-back task procedure has been provided previously in the 
material session. The total time for the N-back task was approximately 8 minutes. 
 
In the verb generation task, sixty-four nouns were divided into two 32 trial blocks, with an 
intermediate rest period of 2 minutes. Each noun appeared for 4 seconds onscreen. 
Participants were required to press the left mouse button as quickly as possible when they had 
mentally generated a verb. 32 nouns were included in the high interference condition and 32 
in the low interference condition, presented in random order. The whole verb generation task 
took approximately 8 minutes. 
 
In between these 3 training tasks, two rest periods were filled with figure comparison tasks, 
taking approximately 3 minutes each.	
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Results  
 
Data from 8 participants were excluded due to missing data for the final analyses. As in 
Exp.1, response accuracy (percentage of the correct recollection) and response time (mms) 
were analyzed via ANOVAs. The interaction was shown to be insignificant, F (1, 34) = 
1.133, p = .15, partial η2 =.032 (Figure 6). Despite this non-significance, I noted a rather 
apparent decrement of the response accuracy in the high depletion group with the high 
interference (experimental) condition only, when comparing before depletion to after 
depletion. Thus, I further conducted a paired sample t-test, revealing this decrement to be 
indeed significant, t (17) = 2.34, p = .01, d = .55. I also analyzed the response time of correct 
responses. Results indicated no significant main effect and interaction (for descriptive data 
see Table 4).  
 
Figure 6. Response accuracy (percentage of correct responses) of the transfer task (AB-AD task), as a 
function of group (high vs. low depletion) and time (pre and post-depletion) of Exp.2.  
 
 
Table 4 
Response Times (mms) of the Correct Responses for the Transfer Task (AB, AD task) 
Interference condition	 Test phase	 Depletion group	
low	 high	
low	 pre	 2623.25 (426.77)	 2907.22 (728.75)	
post	 2924.81 (978.38)	 2549.86 (415.91)	
high	 pre	 3419.81 (1371.18)	 3329.06 (1036.25)	
post	 2816.39 (768.36)	 2681.53 (585.46)	
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Discussion 
 
Table 4 illustrates a trend in which participants performed faster after depletion compared 
with before depletion in 3 out of all 4 conditions (low interference condition after high 
depletion, high interference condition after both low and high depletion). This speed 
improvement trend ran counter to the expectation that participants’	response time should be 
longer after depletion, indicating the depletion effect. However, this speed improvement could 
simply be due to practice with the AB-AD task. Moreover, I would argue that the response 
time in the current experiment could not be considered a proper measure in this regard. First, 
as demonstrated in Table 3, the response time baseline was highly scattered, indicating rather 
large individual differences. Second, while the current depletion procedure might work very 
well for some people, the response time may not be influenced much, as it can be easily 
affected by many other factors (e.g., motivation or one’s own response behaviors). Therefore, 
I consider the response accuracy as a better measure to check the depletion effect. 
Additionally, the correlations between the response accuracy and the response time were not 
significant (Table 5). Thus, the significant decrement in response accuracy in the high 
interference condition in the high depletion group could not be due to speed improvement in 
response time, i.e., absence of the speed accuracy trade-off. 
 
Table 5 
Correlations between Response Accuracy and Response Time of Correct Responses (Exp.2) 
Interference condition	 Test phase	 Depletion group	
low	 high	
low	 pre	 .133	 -.158	
post	 -.381	 -.352	
high	 pre	 -.132	 -.206	
post	 -.177	 -.054	
 
 
The nature of Exp.2 was in fact a manipulation check testing whether the depletion effect 
worked under certain intensity. In turn, the effective depletion procedure would be applied on 
top of the HB memory paradigm. I need to clarify one point about the necessity of Exp.2 and 
the reasons for its design configuration. That is, I did not directly use the classic retroactive 
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interference task (the modified AB-AD task validated from Exp.1) as a training task during 
the depletion procedure. Instead, several other tasks demanding resistance to interference 
were used. The AB-AD task was only used as a transfer task presented pre and post-depletion. 
Thus, in subsequent Exp.3, I determined not to apply the AB-AD task as a training task 
during depletion either. This was due to the material similarity between the AB-AD task and 
HB memory task. More specifically, both tasks involve semantic information paired with 
numbers and both require numeric responses. If I directly use the AB-AD task in between as a 
training task, participants’ responses could be highly influenced by the numeric responses in 
the AB-AD task, both when they are asked to generate a numeric estimation in the HB OJ 
phase and when they are asked to recall their initial numeric estimation in the HB ROJ phase. 
Thus, the potential depletion effect of interference resistance ability obtained from the HB 
task could be confounded simply by depletion of repeated material (i.e., numerical) 
presentation. Instead, I used other interference tasks not involving numbers for the depletion 
procedure so that the expected depletion transfer effect on HB performance (in Exp.3) could 
reflect the authentic underlying relationship between interference and HB. This is precisely 
the value of Exp.2, in that I ensured the depletion procedure could be effectively transferred 
to the classic retroactive interference paradigm which I would argue highly resembles the HB 
memory paradigm. 
 
Although the optimal result pattern (significant 3-way interaction) was not observed in this 
experiment, the depletion procedure could have worked, indicated by the results of the paired 
sample t-test. It was shown that participants performed significantly worse after depletion 
(percentage of correct responses M = 30.50, SE = 5.1) compared with before depletion 
(percentage of correct responses M = 40.26, SE = 5.2), only in the high interference condition 
and only after high depletion of interference resistance ability. Indeed, they did not show 
impaired performance after the low depletion procedure in the low interference condition in 
which minimal interference resistance ability was required. Thus, the deterioration of 
performance in the high interference condition after the high depletion process could not be 
due to fatigue caused by general cognitive ability performing one task successively, but rather 
a specific cognitive process involving interference resolution ability. As to the 3-way 
interaction, I presumably would need a bigger sample to reach a significant level. Thus, in the 
next experiment, a greater sample of participants were recruited to apply the depletion 
procedure validated in this experiment in addition to HB memory paradigm. 
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Experiment 3 
 
In Experiment 3, the current depletion manipulation of interference resistance was applied to 
the memory HB paradigm. Specifically, the transfer task in Exp.3 is a HB memory task 
applying the same training tasks used in Exp.2 (i.e., a series of interference tasks). The 
purpose of Exp.3 is to investigate the main puzzle of the current study –	what are the 
fundamental mechanisms underlying the HB memory paradigm. The underlying logic is that 
the magnitude of HB should become larger after participants’	interference resistance ability is 
depleted, thus suggesting that people are normally hindsight biased due to their ineffective 
resistance to the retroactive interference induced by later presented information.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 61 students participated in Exp.3. Twenty-one were male. The participants ranged 
in age from 18 to 26 years (M = 21.09, SD = 3.00). Two were non-native German speakers. 
They were paid either 12 Euro or a 1.5-hour credit toward the completion of their Bachelor of 
Psychology course.  
 
Design  
The dependent variables in this experiment were HB task measures: the perfect recall 
percentage of ROJ and the proximity index of HB (see Pohl, 2007). I also conducted a 
manipulation test, with the dependent variable being the response accuracy of the AB-AD 
task. 
  
The design was a 2 (item type) x 2 (group or depletion intensity) x 2 (depletion time) mixed 
factorial design with item type (whether the correct information was presented as feedback, 
i.e., experimental; or not, i.e., control condition for a particular question) and time (pre vs. 
post-depletion) as two within-subjects variables and depletion intensity (high vs. low 
depletion) as a between-subjects variable.  
 
Materials 
Three types of task were applied in this experiment: a transfer task, a training task and a 
filling task. The modified AB-AD task validated in Exp.1 was used as a task for manipulation 
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check; it was only presented once prior to and once following the depletion phase. As in 
Exp.2, a series of tasks involving interference resistance were used as training tasks for the 
depletion procedure. For the transfer task in Exp.2, an HB memory task was adopted.  
A total of 88 almanac questions were presented to participants. Of these 88 questions, I 
developed 40 new question items. The other 48 questions were from previous HB studies 
undertaken by colleagues (Dr. Janina Hoffmann and Claudio Pichierri). An example of an HB 
item used in the current study is: 
 
Wie viele Kapitel haben die drei “Herr der Ringe”	Bände (ohne Anhänge) insgesmt? 
 
_______ Kapital 
 
All questions required numerical responses. The appropriate units were always presented. The 
answers were all two digit numbers ranging from 12 to 98, with no two digits being the same 
number. This was to avoid the possibility of mixing up numbers from the AB-AD task.  
The questions were from various knowledge domains, including biology, history, literature, 
geography, physics and architecture. In order to increase the motivation of participants, I 
endeavored to use questions that were likely to be of interest or relevance to them. However, 
in each case, the exact answers to the questions would be unknown to the vast majority of 
participants.  
 
In the OJ phase, all 88 items were presented to all participants (as shown in the above 
example). In the ROJ phase, all 88 items were divided into 2 sets: a pre-depletion set and a 
post-depletion set, with each set comprising 44 items. Within each set there were both 
experimental and control items. With experimental items, questions were presented with their 
correct answers (simultaneously shown on the screen), for example,  
 
 
Wie viele Kapitel haben die drei “Herr der Ringe”	Bände (ohne Anhänge) insgesmt? 
Die richtige Antwort ist 62 Kapital. 
 
Deine Antwort von Gestern war 
_______ Kapital 
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With control items, questions were presented without the correct answers1: 
 
Wie viele Kapitel haben die drei “Herr der Ringe”	Bände (ohne Anhänge) insgesmt? 
 
Deine Antwort von Gestern war 
_______ Kapital 
 
Procedure 
As in Exp.2, there were 3 phases in Exp.3: pre and post-depletion phases and the depletion 
phase. However, considering the nature of HB memory tasks, i.e., there should be a retention 
interval between OJ and ROJ phases, we conducted the experiment across 2 days (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Schematic depiction of the procedure of Exp.3. From left to right, task applied pre-depletion 
(both in session 1 and in session 2) during depletion, and post-depletion. The first and second rows 
illustrate the high depletion group and the low depletion group, respectively. 
 
 
Participants were randomly assigned into two groups: the high depletion group and the low 
depletion group. They were told that they would take part in a general knowledge test at the 
point of recruitment and again when given instructions at the beginning of the experiment. 
                                                
1	 Each item was presented in either the experimental condition or in the control condition. No single 
item was presented in dual condition types as per this example, which is repeated in both forms here 
only to illustrate how questions were presented in the control condition.	
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They were also to give numerical estimations as best they could, given they would probably 
not know the exact answers to most of the questions. Thus, they were not informed about the 
ultimate purpose of the experiment, the HB paradigm or the later depletion procedure.  
 
In day 1, all participants were provided with the HB questionnaire including all 88 items. 
Items were presented in a randomised order to each participant. For each item, a question and 
answer box were shown in the same screenshot so that participants would be able to review 
the question any time while they were giving their OJs. The process of answering questions 
was self-paced. Participants were asked to press the return key after they had given their 
estimation for each question. The next question then appeared onscreen. The whole OJ phase 
(session 1) took approximately 30 minutes for each participant to complete.  
 
In day 2, each participant was presented with half of the 88 items and asked for their ROJs 
after one trial of the AB-AD task, followed by the depletion procedure. Of the 44 items before 
depletion (i.e., the first set, items 1-44), half were experimental items with correct answers 
presented simultaneously with ROJs requests, while the other half were control items with no 
provision of correct answers.  
 
The depletion procedure was the same as that in Exp.2.  
 
After depletion, one trial of the AB-AD task was given prior to the other 44 items being 
presented to participants (these being items 45-88, again half experimental, half control), who 
were again asked for their ROJs. As such, all items were partially counterbalanced across 
participants within each depletion group. Questions were identical to those in the first session, 
however, presented in a randomised order within each set.  
 
For the ROJ phase, participants were told they would be presented with the same general 
knowledge questions from the previous day. Their task was to remember their answers to 
each question as accurately as they could. This was emphasized in the instructions using bold 
font. They were told that for some questions, the correct answers would be given under the 
questions, but I (as experimenter) was interested in how well participants were able to 
remember their previous estimations. Thus, the best answers were those closest to the answers 
provided the day before, irrespective of what the correct answers were. The second session 
took participants approximately 50 to 60 minutes to complete.  
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Results 
 
All participants returned on the second day for the depletion procedure and HB ROJ task. 
Data from 8 participants was excluded due to too much missing data for final analyses. For 
the two experiments involving HB (Exp.3 and Exp.4), results would be reported from 
traditional AVOVAs of the perfect recall percentage and HB magnitude using the proximity 
index (Pohl, 1992) and results obtained using multinomial modeling (Erdfelder & Buchner, 
1998). Comparisons across these two methods would be made and discussed. Before 
conducting a detailed analyse, data (both OJs and ROJs) were sorted as follows: 
 
1. All missing data was excluded (440 cases out of 4664 = 53 participants × 88 questions).  
2. Some participants were confused by a particular unit. Taking the item “ Wie alt wurde 
Goethe?” as an example, participants were required to give the last 2 digit number (i.e., 
68) while the first 2 digit number “19____” was provided. Some participants overlooked 
the already given “19” and wrote down the whole 4 digit response (e.g., 1962). Such 
clear cases of input error were corrected rather than being excluded before data analyses. 
3. Extreme data was excluded. The exclusion criterion for the current experiments 
comprised those estimates falling outside the median plus or minus 4 times the 
interquartile range for each item (Tukey, 1977). As a result, 513 data cases were 
excluded out of all 8448 cases, this being a 6.07% exclusion rate. 
4. The data was then standardized so that comparisons could be conducted across questions 
that were scaled differently (i.e., with different units). 
 
ANOVAs 
I conducted ANOVAs with four variables of Exp.3, namely response accuracy of the 
interference task (AB-AD task) and 3 measures of HB task: the quality of original judgments, 
the quality of recall of original judgments, and the shift in recalled judgments. 
 
Response Accuracy of the Interference Task (AB-AD task) 
The response accuracy, i.e., percentage of correct recall, was analyzed using ANOVAs. The 
results showed that response accuracy 1) was significantly lower with the high interference 
condition compared to the low interference condition across two depletion groups, F (1, 51) = 
15.306, p <. 01, partial η2 =. 25; and 2) was not significantly different between pre and 
post-depletion conditions F (1, 51) = 1.102, p = .32, partial η2 =. 189.  
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Hindsight Bias measure: Quality of Original Judgments 
Results showed that although the difference in the percentage of correct OJs between the high 
depletion group and low depletion group was readily discernible, it did not reach significance, 
F (1, 51) = 1.998, p = .06, partial η2 =. 104. Furthermore, in total, 1.99% of the original 
judgments equaled the correct answers across the two groups. These correct original 
estimations were excluded for the further analyses, as HB is not defined for them.   
 
Hindsight Bias measure: Quality of Recall of the Original Judgments 
I first analyzed the percentage of perfect ROJs, i.e., cases in which participants gave exactly 
the same ROJs as their OJs. Results showed that there was a significant main effect based on 
group, F (1, 51) = 9.306, p < .01, partial η2 = .154 (Figure 8). Due to this significance, and the 
approaching significance of the difference in correct original judgment percentages between 
two randomly assigned groups, I further tested the distribution normality of the two groups 
respectively. Results for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test for normality (Field, 
2007) showed that the distribution of both groups did not deviate significantly from a normal 
distribution (D = .084, p = .211) (for histogram see Figure 9). Thus, the normality of the 
current sample was met.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Response accuracy (percentage of ROJ = OJ) of the HB task, as a function of group (high 
vs. low depletion), time (pre and post-depletion) and item type (ctr: no feedback vs. exp: with 
feedback) of Exp.3.  
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Figure 9. Histograms of the perfect recollections of the original judgments of the 
high depletion group (left) and low depletion group (right) of Exp.3. 
 
 
In regard to the 3-way interaction of interest to us, it was found to be not significant, F (1, 51) 
= 1.123, p = .29, partial η2 = .022.  
 
 
Hindsight Bias measure: Mean Shift of the Recalled Judgments 
The perfectly recalled OJ and ROJ pairs were excluded for the shift toward CJ measure. The 
3-way ANOVA yielded an overall main effect of item type, F (1, 51) = 17.98, p < .01. The 
mean shift values were 0.35(±0.04) for experimental items, and only 0.02(±0.05) for control 
items, indicating an overall robust HB effect. However, regarding the variable depletion 
group, ANOVA results showed that there was neither a significant main effect of group, F (1, 
51) = 1.149, p = .29, partial η2 = .022, nor a significant 3-way interaction, F (1, 51) = 1.205, p 
= .28, partial η2 = .023. Furthermore, paired sample t-tests comparing the delta-z mean shift 
between pre and post-depletion procedures with the experimental groups also showed no 
significant difference, t (26) = 1.57, p = .06, d = .31, 1-ß	= .47; t (25) = 1.29, p = .10, d = .35, 
1-ß	= .54 for the low depletion group and the high depletion group, respectively (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Mean shift of the recall of original judgments toward the correct answers from the 
incorrectly recalled pairs of the HB task, as a function of group (high vs. low depletion), time (pre and 
post-depletion) and item type (ctr: no feedback vs. exp: with feedback) of Exp.3.  
 
 
To examine the extent to which (if at all) participants’ bias toward the correct answers is 
associated with their perfect recollections of the original estimates, I further computed the 
correlations between the two measures of HB (Table 6). 
 
 
Table 6 
Correlations between Perfect Recall Percentage and Mean Shift of Recalled Judgments of 
Incorrectly Recalled Pairs, both High Depletion Group and Low Depletion Group (the latter 
ones in brackets) (Exp.3) 
Variables	 Δz_pre_ctrl.	 Δz_pre_exp.	 Δz_post_ctrl.	 Δz_post_exp.	
Perf.recall_pre_ctrl.	 .194 (-.170)	 .243 (.351)	 .228 (.019)	 .110 (.196)	
Perf.recall_pre_exp.	 .125 (-.155)	 .351 (.368)	 .271 (-.066)	 .059 (.202)	
Perf.recall_post_ctrl.	 -.133 (.025)	 -.015 (.264)	 .389*(-.011)	 -.152 (.107)	
Perf.recall_post_exp.	 .083 (-.244)	 .085 (.200)	 .161 (-.134)	 .031 (.083)	
 
N = 26, * p < .05 (N = 27) 
 
 
Results showed that the correlations between the two measures of HB were mostly not 
significant, with the exception being the control condition after depletion (r = .389, p < .05). 
Moreover, I conducted the correlation analyses with the average across experimental and 
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control conditions and with the difference between the two item type conditions, across two 
depletion intensity groups. No single correlation was significant.  
 
Moreover, since the HB items in this experiment were only partly counterbalanced across 
time (pre vs. post-depletion), I further tested the item set effect. Results showed that the 
difference in participants’	original estimates and the correct judgments between two item sets 
(pre-set 1-44 vs. post-set 45-88) was not significant, t (51) = 2.33, p < .01. Thus, there was no 
significant difference in material difficulty between two item sets across both groups. 
Consequently, the difference between pre and post-depletion for both groups could not be due 
to differences in material difficulty, albeit without full counterbalancing. 
 
Multinomial Model-Based Analyses 
For all model tests and parameter estimations according to HB 13 (Erdfelder & Buchner, 
1998, discussed in introduction session) and its sub-models in this study, I excluded the 
1.99% pairs in which the original estimations equaled the correct answers. The raw 
frequencies of all 10 rank orders of OJ, CJ and ROJ for experimental and control conditions 
across all participants within each depletion group are provided in Appendix A. Based on 
these frequencies, I conducted the multinomial modeling analyses using multiTree, a 
java-based computer program by Moshagen (2010). First, the goodness of fit of the model 
was evaluated for the whole data set (i.e., 2 depletion intensity groups x 2 item type 
conditions x 2 depletion time conditions, thus resulting in 8 trees), using the likelihood ratio 
chi-square statistic G2 (with df = 20). The G2 (20) value was 18.89, with p = 0.53, indicating a 
satisfactory model fit.  
 
Table 7 shows the results derived from testing the presence of recollection bias, 
reconstruction bias, and CJ adoption, as well as the null hypotheses regarding these tests for 
each depletion group both before and after depletion. To test the presence of recollection bias, 
I compared a model variant in which the rC and rE parameters were free to vary with a 
restricted model in which the two parameters were equal. Should the significance of the 
comparison be present (p < .01), I would in turn conclude that the restricted model assuming 
the two parameters were equal did not fit the data, and therefore the two parameters would not 
differ significantly, and vice versa. Likewise, to test the presence of reconstruction bias and 
CJ adoption, I compared a model variant in which b and y were set to free with a restricted 
model in which the two parameters were constant at zero. If the comparison was found to be 
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significant, I would then conclude that the parameters were different from zero, and vice 
versa.  
 
 
Table 7 
Results of Testing for the Presence of Recollection Bias, Reconstruction Bias, and Correct- 
Judgment Adoption in Each Depletion Group, Pre and Post-depletion Respectively (Exp.3) 
  Pre-depletion	 Post-depletion	
Type of bias	 Depletion 
group	  Null hypothesis	  ΔG2(df = 1)	  Null hypothesis	  ΔG2(df = 1)	
Recollection 
bias	 high	 rC1 = rE1	 2.06 	 rC2 = rE2	 0.84	
low	 rC3 = rE3	 0.04	 rC4 = rE4	 4.20	
Reconstruction 
bias	 high	 b1 = 0	 34.94*	 b2 = 0	 22.45*	
low	 b3 = 0	 18.93*	 b4= 0	 19.80*	
CJ  
adoption	 high	 c1 = 0	 9.61*	 c2 = 0	 0.17	
low	 c3 = 0	 0.89	 c4 = 0	 3.87	
 
Note. ΔG2 = decrement in the likelihood ratio chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic compared 
with the unrestricted model; rC = probability of participants’	correctly recalling the original 
judgment (control items); rE = probability of participants’	correctly recalling the original 
judgment (experimental items); b = probability of a biased reconstruction given a failure to 
recall the original judgment; c = probability of adopting the correct judgment, with 1, 2, 3 and 
4 denoting high depletion group pre and post-depletion; low depletion group pre and 
post-depletion time condition respectively. 
* p < .001 
  
 
Table 8 presents the pre and post-depletion comparisons of each depletion intensity group for 
the parameters of interest. To test whether the parameter differences between the depletion 
time conditions were significant for each depletion intensity group, I compared a model for 
two depletion time conditions in which all parameters were allowed to differ between these 
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two conditions with a restricted model in which the parameters between the two depletion 
time conditions were set as equal. If the comparison was significant, I would then conclude 
that the restricted model assuming two equal parameters of the two depletion time conditions 
(pre and post) did not fit the data anymore, and hence the two parameters would be 
significantly different, and vice versa.  
 
 
Table 8 
ΔG2 values of Testing Pre vs. Post-depletion Differences in Multinomial-Model Parameters 
(Exp.3) 
Comparison conditions	 rC	 rE	 b	 c	
High depl. pre vs. post-	 2.25	 1.06	 0.83	 0.65	
Low depl. pre vs. post-	 1.36	 1.15	 0.01	 2.23	
 
Note. ΔG2 = decrement in the likelihood ratio chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic (df = 1) 
compared with the unrestricted model; rC = probability of participants’	correctly recalling the 
original judgment (control items); rE = probability of participants’	correctly recalling the 
original judgment (experimental items); b = probability of a biased reconstruction given a 
failure to recall the original judgment; c = probability of adopting the correct judgment. 
* p < .001 
 
 
Figure 11 shows the estimates of the parameters of interest, i.e., recollection bias parameters, 
reconstruction bias parameters and the CJ adoption parameters for both depletion intensity 
groups and both depletion time conditions.  
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Figure 11. Multinomial model parameter estimates for depletion group of Exp.3. Recollection bias is 
the difference between correct recollection in the control condition (rC) and correct recollection in the 
experimental condition (rE). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Recollection parameters 
As shown in Table 7, overall there were no recollection biases either before or after depletion, 
irrespective of the depletion group (high vs. low). The exact estimates of parameter rC (with 
their 95% confidence intervals) were 0.48 (±0.03), 0.44 (±0.02), 0.32 (±0.02) and 0.36 
(±0.02) for the high depletion group pre and post-depletion and for the low depletion group 
pre and post-depletion condition respectively; and the corresponding rE values were 0.44 
(±0.02), 0.41 (±0.02), 0.33 (±0.02) and 0.30 (±0.02). Moreover, for both depletion groups 
there was no significant difference in recollection bias parameters before and after depletion 
across control and experimental items, as indicated in Table 8.  
 
Reconstruction bias 
As indicated by the reconstruction parameter b, results from Table 7 show that reconstruction 
bias exists in all conditions. The exact b values (with their 95% confidence intervals) were 
0.45 (±0.07), 0.36 (±0.08), 0.34 (±0.07) and 0.33 (±0.08) for the high depletion group in pre 
and post-depletion conditions, and for the low depletion group in the respective depletion 
time conditions. Unfortunately however, the difference in reconstruction bias between before 
and after depletion for both groups was not significant (as shown in Table 8 and Figure 11).  
 
CJ adoption 
The c parameters denoting the correct judgment adoption were found to exist in only one 
condition, this being the high depletion group in the pre-depletion condition (see Table 7). 
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This CJ adoption process disappeared after depletion with the high depletion group. The exact 
c values were 0.04 (±0.04), 0.01 (±0.03), 0.01 (±0.01) and 0.06 (±0.03) for the high depletion 
group in the pre and post-depletion conditions, and for the low depletion group in these 
conditions respectively. In regard to differences in the CJ adoption parameter between before 
and after depletion, these were not significant for either group (see Table 8 and Figure 11).  
 
 
Discussion 
To test whether the depletion procedure worked as effectively as in Exp.2, I included one trial 
AB-AD task before and after depletion in the current experiment. Indicated by the ANOVAS, 
the significant lower response accuracy of the high interference condition compared to that of 
the low interference condition affirmed the validity of the AB-AD task (i.e., the AB-AD task 
proved suitable as an interference task). However, the response accuracy was then no 
significant difference when comparing between pre- and post-depletion conditions. This 
unfortunately revealed that the depletion procedure did not work well in Exp.3, which could 
however be due to the fact that only one trial AB-AD task was presented to participants. 
 
As to the quality of OJs, I compared the percentage of correct responses during the OJ phase 
across two groups (the high depletion group and the low depletion group) before depletion.  
The non-significant difference of correct OJ estimates confirmed that the knowledge about the 
HB items between two groups did not differ. Thus, randomization worked well in the current 
experiment. 
 
Regarding the quality of recall of OJs, results showed that participants in the high depletion 
group remembered their OJs significantly better than their counterparts in the low depletion 
group, regardless of whether or not they had gone through the depletion procedure. Overall, 
the pattern of the perfect recollection percentage between pre- and post-depletion was rather 
consistent with the pattern of the interference task measure (response accuracy). While no 
significant depletion effect was revealed by either measure, the descriptive pattern was 
similarly decreasing. 
 
Despite that the two groups (high and low depletion) were significantly different in terms of 
the perfect recall of OJs, the shift toward CJs was statistically equal. This rather intriguing 
pattern showed that participants’ biased reconstruction (indicated by the delta-z measure) was 
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not due to their memory deficit (indicated by the perfect recollection measure). Further 
correlational analyses showed in Table 6 further provided good empirical support for the 
assertion that perfect recall and bias of imperfectly recalled judgments should be kept apart as 
two distinct measures (Dehn & Erdfelder, 1998; Pohl & Haracic, 2005). 
 
The most stimulating result observed here was a decreasing trend both in the perfect recall 
percentage and in the secondary shift toward the correct judgments of incorrectly recalled 
items after depletion. As discussed above, participants’ interference resistance ability was 
expected to be fatigued through the depletion procedure, which was also demonstrated in 
Exp.2. Furthermore, the theoretical conjecture that I formed was that the memory type of HB 
could in fact be nothing more than a retroactive interference paradigm. It then follows that 
participants’ HB magnitude would increase after specific depletion, since their ability to resist 
interference had been exhausted. However, the decreasing trends seen in this experiment ran 
counter to what I had anticipated, while not reaching the level of statistical significance. 
 
Several factors lead us to view these results as rather meaningful. First, although ANOVAs 
revealed no significant differences in both perfect recall percentage and the shift toward 
correct answers for either group (high and low depletion), the differences in mean of delta-z 
between pre and post-depletion for both groups were already approaching significant, p1 = 
.06, p2 = .10. Second, the pattern of differences in HB magnitude was quite consistent across 
the two groups (low and high depletion), and could not be dismissed as an accidental result. 
Third, power analyses computed with the G*POWER program (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) showed that the non-significant results could be due to low power (0.327 and 
0.237 respectively for low and high depletion group). Taken as a whole, attempts to interpret 
the results were still necessary. 
 
The multinomial model-based analyses showed that no significant difference in recollection 
bias for both depletion groups, across all conditions (pre- vs. post-depletion and control vs. 
experimental condition). So was it the case with reconstruction bias. However, CJ adoption 
process disappeared after depletion with high depletion group, implying that participants were 
less convinced that the present correct answers exactly matched their original estimates after 
depletion, as the c parameter only existed in pre-depletion condition of high depletion group. 
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In summary, results of the conventional ANOVAs showed that after depletion there were no 
significant differences in perfect recall percentages or the proximity index for both depletion 
groups (see Figure 8 and Figure 10). These results for the two HB magnitude measures 
suggest that the depletion manipulation intended to fatigue participants’ interference 
resistance process did not work as expected. That is to say, participants did not become more 
biased by the later presented correct judgments after they were depleted by their interference 
resistance ability. This is in line with what the multinomial modeling analyses revealed. 
Specifically, the reconstruction bias parameter b did not differ significantly after depletion for 
either group. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the trend direction of critical parameters 
(delta-z mean in ANOVAs and b in multinomial modeling analyses) was rather congruous, 
i.e., decreasing rather than increasing. This decreasing trajectory was contrary to the 
expectations before the experiment was conducted, which prompted the current search for an 
appropriate interpretation; in turn, I proposed a new experiment with a refined manipulation 
to further test the proposition. 
 
As demonstrated in the results, it could not be the case that the specific interference resistance 
ability was depleted as there was no difference in decrement between the high and low 
depletion groups. Clearly a specific “other” feature common to the two groups may have been 
diminished through the depletion procedure. The next step then was to detect and identify this 
underlying feature. 
 
 
 
Experiment 4 
 
Previous research has suggested that typical memory HB paradigm may be no more than a 
retroactive interference process. However, results of Exp.3, both from the ANOVAs using the 
conventional HB measure and from more sophisticated multinomial modeling analyses, 
indicated that there must be MORE than just interference processes at work in HB. 
Furthermore, equipped with the commonly predisposed interference resistance mechanism, 
people attempt to counteract HB in normal cases. That is to say, if one devotes sufficient 
effort to interference resistance activity, there should be a decrease in HB magnitude. Linked 
to the more specific results of Exp.2, that is decreasing rather than increasing HB magnitude 
after depletion, I can expect to find a discrete process involved that stimulates the occurrence 
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of HB in normal cases. Hence, HB ought to decrease after the cognitive resources demanded 
by such process deteriorate. Review of the theoretical discussion in previous studies suggests 
the concept of knowledge-updating may fit with the current conjecture here. The 
knowledge-updating notion was embedded in more than one theory or model explaining HB, 
examples being the immediate assimilation account by Fischhoff (1975), the SARA model by 
Pohl et al. (2003) and the RAFT model by Hoffrage et al. (2000). However, the immediate 
association account argues for an automatic process right after the correct judgment is 
presented. Consequently, HB could not become depleted due to this automaticity, assuming 
that depletion acts only on controlled activities, but not on automatic ones in which minimal 
cognitive resources are required (Schmeichel et al., 2003). Both the SARA and RAFT models 
also take the knowledge-updating process into consideration, however no specific 
clarification is made as to whether this process is more automatic or controlled. Furthermore, 
if it is the latter case, how could it be controlled with greater precision? In relation to the 
plausibility effect (for discussion see introduction), I hypothesize a dual process account of 
HB in which both a certain knowledge-updating mechanism and interference resistance 
activity are fundamental to the HB memory paradigm. Both components are controlled, rather 
than automatic. The former is adaptive in nature, in the sense that people endorse more 
knowledge-updating activity only when the later presented information is correct.  
 
In Exp.4, I test this hypothesis using the depletion procedure in combination with the 
plausibility manipulation of subsequently presented information (i.e., CJ). More specifically, 
in the HB task, information presented later would be labeled as either the “correct answer”	or 
the “wrong answer”	of a question. As a result, there are 2 experimental conditions and 1 
control condition in the HB task. Methodically, in order to get comparable results across 
experiments, I should in theory have the same number of HB items within each item type 
condition, meaning 3 x 44 = 132 items per condition. However, empirically this quota itself 
would lead to confusion and fatigue for participants. As a result, I used the same number of 
HB items as in Exp.3, separating them into 3 conditions. What is more, Exp.4 compelled us to 
recruit additional participants. Experiment 3 had comprised 88 items x 53 participants / 2 
conditions (experimental vs. control) = 2332 cases per condition. In order to keep the overall 
frequency of cases within each condition constant, I would need at least 2332 cases x 3 
conditions (2 experimental vs. control) ÷	88 items = 80 participants for Exp.4.  
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With this labeling manipulation, expectations in terms HB magnitude would be as follows: 
 
5. There should be a plausibility effect in which HB is significantly larger when the later 
presented information is labeled “correct answer”	as opposed to when it is labeled 
“wrong answer”.  
6. After depletion, HB should decrease in the	“correct answer”	condition, as the adaptive 
knowledge-updating behavior leading to increased HB in the normal condition would 
be exhausted.  
7. In contrast, after depletion, HB should increase in the condition labeled “wrong 
answer”, as the interference resistance ability that counters HB in the normal situation 
will have been eroded.  
8. As a consequence, I anticipate the pre-depletion plausibility effect to disappear after 
depletion. 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 118 students participated in Exp.4, of which forty-eight were male. The participants 
ranged in age from 19 to 29 years (M = 23.01, SD = 2.37). All but one were native German 
speakers. They were paid either 12 Euro or a 1.5-hour credit toward their Bachelor in 
Psychology course.  
 
Design  
The dependent variables for ANOVAs in Exp.4 were HB task measures: the perfect recall 
percentage of ROJ and the proximity index of HB. As with Exp.3, I conducted a manipulation 
test with the dependent variable being the response accuracy of the AB-AD task. The design 
of ANOVAs was a 3 (item type) x 2 (group or depletion intensity) x 2 (depletion time) mixed 
factorial design with item type (whether the correct information was presented as feedback or 
not, and if yes, how was it labeled, i.e., the control condition and 2 experimental conditions: 
one labeled “correct answer”	and the other labeled “wrong answer”) and time (pre vs. 
post-depletion condition) as two within-subjects variables, and depletion intensity (high vs. 
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low depletion group) as a between-subjects variable. Finally, I performed multinomial 
modeling analyses for data generated in Exp.4. 	
Materials 
As in Exp.3, three types of task were applied in this experiment: a transfer task, a training task 
and a filling task. All materials for this experiment were the same as in Exp.3, except for one 
more experimental manipulation in the HB task –	labeling of the later presented information. 
More specifically, the same 88 almanac questions were used for the OJ phase. With the ROJ 
phase on the second day, one more experimental condition was employed. Control items were 
identical to those in Exp.3. An example of an item labeled in the“correct answer”	condition 
would be: 
Wie viele Kapitel haben die drei “Herr der Ringe”	Bände (ohne Anhänge) insgesmt? 
Die richtige Antwort ist 62 Kapital. 
 
Deine Antwort von Gestern war 
_______ Kapital 
 
 
By comparison, this same example labeled in the “wrong answer”	condition would be: 
 
Wie viele Kapitel haben die drei “Herr der Ringe”	Bände (ohne Anhänge) insgesmt? 
Die falsche Antwort ist 62 Kapital. 
 
Deine Antwort von Gestern war 
_______ Kapital 
 
 
As illustrated above, the same numbers (answers) were presented, only with different 
labeling, these being emphasized in bold font and underline. Although the same HB questions 
were employed in Exp.4 as in Exp.3, the items remain valid. The new experiment was 
conducted one semester after the third experiment, meaning that it is improbably participants 
could recall data. What is more, as most participants took part in the experiments in order to 
gain one-off credits for their bachelor courses, there was no incentive to take part a second 
time; as such, it is unlikely any participants were involved in both trials.  
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Procedure 
The detailed experimental procedure for Exp.4 (see Figure 12) was the same as Exp.3, with 
the following 2 exceptions.  
 
1. In the HB ROJ phase on the second day, the 44 HB items applied pre and post-depletion 
were further split into 3 conditions, rather than 2 conditions in Exp.3. More specifically, 
14 questions were presented as control items in which no feedback was provided at all 
during ROJ. The remaining 30 questions were divided into two groups, with half (15) 
being presented with the correct answers to the questions, which were labeled “correct 
answer”; while the other half were also accompanied with the correct answers, they were 
misleadingly labeled “wrong answer”. Once more, participants were informed at the 
beginning of the ROJ phase that their next task was to recall as accurately as possible 
their answers from the preceding day. They were told that for some questions, the correct 
answers would be provided, while for other questions, wrong answers would be 
presented. 
2. To further strengthen the intensity of the depletion procedure, I added 5 more trials of 
AB-AD task as the training task. Participants in the high depletion group performed the 
task only in the high interference condition, i.e., the AB-AD condition. Participants in 
the low depletion group performed the AB-only condition. 
 
 
Figure 12. Schematic depiction of the procedure of Exp.4. From left to right, task applied 
pre-depletion (both in session 1 and in session 2), during depletion, and post-depletion. The first and 
second rows illustrate the high depletion group and low depletion group, respectively. 
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Results 
 
All participants returned on the second day for the depletion procedure and the HB ROJ task. 
Again data from 8 participants was excluded due to too much missing data for final analyses. 
As with Exp.3, results from traditional ANOVAs of the perfect recall percentage and HB 
magnitude using the proximity index (Pohl, 1992) and results obtained using multinomial 
modeling (Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998) with this experiment are reported below. Comparisons 
across these two methods are also made and discussed. Data analyses were conducted in the 
same manner as in Exp.3.  
 
Before conducting detailed analyses, data (both OJs and ROJs) were sorted as follows: 
 
1. All missing data was excluded (616 cases out of 9680 = 110 participants × 88 
questions).  2. Units	that	were	confused	by	the	participants	were	corrected	before	data	analyses	as	in	Exp.3.	
3. Extreme data was excluded. I excluded 825 data cases out of all 18128 cases, this 
being a 4.25% exclusion rate. 
4. The data was then standardized so that comparisons could be conducted across 
questions that were scaled differently (i.e., with different units). 
 
With the F tests (alpha level of 0.01), the current sample size (110) was sufficient to yield a 
power of .99 to detect the depletion effects of a medium size (f = .25; see Cohen, 1988), 
computed with the G*POWER program (Faul et al., 2007). 
 
ANOVAs 
I conducted ANOVAs with four variables of Exp.4, namely, response accuracy of the 
interference task (AB-AD task) and 3 measures of HB task: the quality of original judgments, 
the quality of recall of the original judgments, and the shift of the recalled judgments. 
 
Response Accuracy of the Interference Task (AB-AD task) 
To test whether the depletion procedure worked as effectively as in Exp.2 and 3, I included 
one trial AB-AD task before and after depletion in the current experiment. The response 
accuracy, i.e., percentage of correct recall, was analyzed using ANOVAs. Results showed that 
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the response accuracy 1) was significantly lower in the high interference condition compared 
with the low interference condition across two depletion groups, F (1, 108) = 18.06, p <. 01, 
partial η2 =. 21, and 2) decreased significantly in the post-depletion condition compared to the 
pre-depletion condition, F (1, 108) = 12.20, p < .01, partial η2 =. 33.  
 
Hindsight Bias measure: Quality of Original Judgments 
The percentage of correct responses during the OJ phase before depletion was compared for 
the low depletion and high depletion groups. The difference in the percentage of correct OJs 
between the two groups was not significant, F (1, 108) = 13.88, p <.01, partial η2 =. 24. In 
total, 1.53% of the original judgments equaled the correct answers across two groups. These 
correct original estimations were excluded from further ANOVAs.  
 
Hindsight Bias measure: Quality of Recall of the Original Judgments 
The perfect recall percentage was first analyzed; that is, cases in which participants gave 
exactly the same ROJs as their OJs. Unlike Exp.3, results of the current experiment showed 
there was no significant main effect of group, F (1, 108) = 1.21, p = .22, partial η2 = .014 
(Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 13. Response accuracy (percentage of ROJ = OJ) of the HB task, as a function of group (high 
vs. low depletion), time (pre and post-depletion) and item type (ctrl: no feedback, WCJ: labeling as 
“wrong answer”	vs. CCJ: labeling as “correct answer”) of Exp.4.  
 
 
As shown in Figure 13, there was a significant main effect of item type (no feedback, labeling 
as “correct answer”	and labeling as “wrong answer”), F (2, 108) = 8.82, p < .01, partial η2 = 
.075 across two groups. Further paired sample t-tests demonstrated a significant decrease in 
perfect recall percentage in both the “correct answer”	and “wrong answer”	conditions as 
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compared to the control conditions, t (54) = 1.33, p < .05 and t (54) = 1.46, p < .05; however, 
this was only the case in the high depletion group after the depletion procedure. No such 
significant decrease was found in the low depletion group either before or after depletion.  
 
Another significant main effect was time (pre vs. post-depletion), F (2, 108) = 17.01, p < .01, 
partial η2 = .136. Further paired sample t-tests showed that a significant decrease existed only 
with items labeled	“correct answer”	after depletion compared with before depletion, and then 
only in the low depletion group, t (54) = 2.71, p < .05. No significant interaction was found 
with the perfect recall percentage measure.  
 
Hindsight Bias measure: Mean Shift of the Recalled Judgments 
As in Exp.3, I excluded all the perfect ROJ and OJ pairs. The remaining pairs provided an 
appropriate means of determining the degree to which the ROJs were biased away from the 
OJs toward the CJs.  
As with Exp.3, the 3-way ANOVA also yielded an overall main effect of item type, F (2, 108) 
= 15.73, p < .01. The mean shift values were 0.42(±0.02) for experimental items, and only 
0.03(±0.03) for control items, indicating an overall robust HB effect. Moreover, the item type 
by depletion time interaction that I am principally interested in was shown to be significant, F 
(2, 108) = 8.13, p < .01, partial η2 =.07 (Figure 14).  
 
 
Figure 14. The mean shift of the recall of the original judgments toward the correct answers from the 
incorrectly recalled pairs of HB task, as a function of group (low vs. high depletion), time (pre and 
post-depletion) and item type (ctrl: no feedback, WCJ: labeling as “wrong answer”	vs. CCJ: labeling 
as “correct answer”) of Exp.4.  
 
Figure 14 shows the results of further paired sample t-tests which reveal that after depletion 
the delta-z mean significantly decreased in the condition labeled “wrong answer”	and 
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significantly increased in the condition labeled “correct answer”, but only in the high 
depletion group, t (54) = 2.50, p < .01, d = .61, 1-β	= .27, t (54) = -1.67, p < .01, d = .55, 1-β	
= .24, respectively.  
 
Moreover, the response time was also checked (more discussion about the reason for this step 
see discussion). The means of response time within each condition is shown in Table 9. 
 
 
Table 9 
Response Times (mms) of the Incorrectly Recalled Pairs for the HB Task of Exp.4 (ctrl: no 
feedback condition, CCJ: condition labeled correct answer, WCJ: condition labeled wrong 
answer) 
Depletion 
condition	 Low depletion group	
Ctrl.	 CCJ	 WCJ	
Pre-	 3678.92 (239.77)	 3888.32 (245.45)	 3721.53 (213.44)	
Post-	 3421.98 (256.21)	 3698.91 (258.41)	 3622.19 (229.10)	
 High depletion group	
 Ctrl.	 CCJ	 WCJ	
Pre-	 3559.21(199.87)	 2991.69 (317.69)	 3315.00 (290.88)	
Post-	 3319.80 (231.98)	 3017.22 (222.15)	 3169.54 (229.44)	
 
 
Multinomial Model-Based Analyses 
For all model tests and parameter estimations according to HB 13 (Erdfelder & Buchner, 
1998, discussed in introduction session) and its sub-models in this study, I excluded the 
1.53% pairs in which the original estimations equaled the correct answers. The raw 
frequencies of all 10 rank orders of OJ, CJ and ROJ for experimental and control conditions 
across all participants within each depletion group were provided in Appendix B. Based on 
these frequencies, I conducted multinomial modeling analyses using the multiTree 
(Moshagen, 2010). The goodness of fit of the model was first evaluated for the whole data set 
(i.e., 2 depletion intensity groups x 3 item type conditions x 2 depletion time conditions, thus 
resulting in 12 trees), using the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic G2 (with df = 32). The G2 
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(32) value was 46.02, with p < .01, indicating a non-model fit. Moreover, results showed that 
there were several negative variance estimates and standard errors could not be computed. 
Thus I checked the identifiability of the model using repeated analyses 30 times. Results 
showed that the model was not identifiable. Outcomes demonstrated on the parameters panel 
of multiTree revealed that the CJ adoption parameters c were the items with potential 
problems. Moreover, the theoretical implication of the parameter, that is, that participants may 
be convinced the presented feedback was identical to their first estimation, could make little 
sense in the context of the current experiment. To elaborate here, if the presented feedback 
was constantly and with certainty the correct answer to given questions, there is a probability 
that participants might adopt the feedback as their own previous estimation, as in Exp.3. 
However, in the current experiment, participants were informed explicitly that simultaneously 
presented feedback might also be the “wrong answer”	to a question. Thus, there is minimal 
probability that, being informed of this inherent risk, they would be inclined to adopt the 
feedback to the same extent as when only the correct answer was presented as feedback. 
Therefore, both statistical indication and theoretical implication led us to constrict the c 
parameters (i.e., setting them all constant at zero) for further analyses. Results then showed an 
identifiable model; however, not a satisfactory model fit. Analyses were then conducted with 
discrete groups. Results showed a satisfactory model fit with the data of the high depletion 
group, G2 = 35.44, df = 20, p > .01, but not for the low depletion group G2 = 43.28, df = 20, p 
< .01. Inspired by Bayen et al (2006) and Pohl et al (2010), the reason of this non-fit for low 
depletion group might be due to the violation of the symmetry assumption. Considering that 
the HB item set used in the current study was never used in previous study, there might be 
some items that violate the symmetry assumption of the HB13 model. Four such items were 
then identified and excluded from the data set, i.e., items that had significantly high number 
of response frequencies in the ROJ = OJ < CJ category compared with the ROJ = OJ > CJ 
category. Participants in low depletion group typically gave underestimated OJs for these 
items and during later ROJ phase gave perfect ROJs. Excluding these 4 items resulted in a 
satisfactory model fit of the data for low depletion group G2 = 39.25, df = 20, p > .01. The 
parameter estimates of the model changed only slightly compared with the set including all 88 
items (smaller than 0.01). Thus, the exclusion of the 4 items did not change the main results. 
More importantly, the high depletion group was more of the interest of the current study, but 
not the low depletion group. Reporting results of low depletion group below was only for the 
integrality of the dissertation. 
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Parameters denoting probability of correct ROJs and of a biased reconstruction if direct recall 
of OJs failed were then obtained for each condition before and after depletion (see Table 10).2 
 
Table 10 
Results of Testing the Presence of Recollection Bias and Reconstruction Bias in the High 
Depletion group (upper part of the table) and in the Low Depletion group (lower part of the 
table), Pre and Post-depletion Respectively (Exp.4) 
(high depl. Group)  Pre-depletion	 Post-depletion	
Type of bias	 HB 
condition 	  Null hypothesis	  ΔG2(df = 1)	  Null hypothesis	  ΔG2(df = 1)	
Recollection 
bias	 CCJ WCJ	 rC1 = rEC1	 0.35	 rC2 = rEC2	 10.74*	rC1 = rEW1	 1.80	 rC2 = rEW2	 9.39*	
Reconstruction 
bias	 CCJ WCJ	 bC1 = 0	 88.21**	 bC2 = 0	 60.90**	bW1 = 0	 30.99**	 bW2 = 0	 63.03**	
 
(low depl. Group)  Pre-depletion	 Post-depletion	
Type of bias	 HB 
condition 	  Null hypothesis	  ΔG2(df = 1)	  Null hypothesis	  ΔG2(df = 1)	
Recollection 
bias	 CCJ WCJ	 rC1 = rEC1	 0.01	 rC2 = rEC2	 5.89*	
rC1 = rEW1	 0.02	 rC2 = rEW2	 3.30*	
Reconstruction 
bias	 CCJ WCJ	 bC1 = 0	 53.29*	 bC2 = 0	 31.07*	bW1 = 0	 42.38**	 bW2 = 0	 57.26**	
 
                                                
2 For the high depletion group, I partly restricted the guessing parameter (h) for the following 
analyses due to their large standard errors and in order to obtain more salient comparison results. The 
restriction was to set guessing parameters equal across control and 2 experimental HB conditions, but 
different across depletion group and depletion time. Moreover, a complete restriction of the h 
parameter, i.e., set h all equal across all conditions, yielded the same pattern of results as those with a 
partly h restriction. 	
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Note. ΔG2 = decrement in the likelihood ratio chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic compared 
with the unrestricted model; rC = probability of participants’	correctly recalling the original 
judgment (control items); rE = probability of participants’	correctly recalling the original 
judgment (experimental items); rEC = probability of participants’	correctly recalling the 
original judgment (experimental items when feedback was labeled as “correct answer”); rEW = 
probability of participants’	correctly recalling the original judgment (experimental items when 
feedback was labeled “wrong answer”); b = probability of a biased reconstruction given a 
failure to recall the original judgment; with 1, 2 denoting the high depletion group pre and 
post-depletion, respectively; and with C, W denoting the condition labeled	“correct answer”	
and that labeled	“wrong answer”, respectively). CCJ = condition labeled “correct answer”	
condition, WCJ = condition labeled “wrong answer”. 
** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
 
The Subsequent Table 11 presents the pre and post-depletion comparisons of each depletion 
group for the parameters of interest. The same principle of testing such comparisons was 
adopted as in Exp.3.  
 
Table 11 
ΔG2 values of Testing Pre vs. Post-depletion Differences in Multinomial-Model Parameters 
(Exp.4) 
Comparison conditions	 rC	 rEC	 rEW	 bC	 bW	
High depl. pre vs. post-	 .14	 5.43*	 1.70	 2.10	 5.09**	
low depl. pre vs. post-	 .09	 5.32*	 1.15	 0.18	 1.99	
 
Note. See Table 10 Note. 
 
 
Figure 15 shows the estimates of the parameters of interest, i.e., recollection bias parameters 
and reconstruction bias parameters for both depletion intensity groups and both depletion time 
conditions.  
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Figure 15. Multinomial model parameter estimates for the depletion groups of Exp.4. Recollection 
bias is the difference between the correct recollection in the control condition (rC) and the correct 
recollection in the experimental condition (rE). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Recollection parameters 
As shown in Table 10, while recollection bias was present in both experimental conditions 
after depletion in the high depletion group, it was only present in the “wrong answer”	
condition before depletion in the low depletion group. In the case of the high depletion group 
(also being the group I was most interested in), the exact estimates of parameter rC (with their 
95% confidence intervals) were 0.42 (±0.02) and 0.43 (±0.02) for pre and post-depletion 
respectively; the corresponding rE values were 0.41 (±0.02), 0.40 (±0.01), 0.36 (±0.02) and 
0.37 (±0.01) for the “correct answer”	condition pre and post-depletion, and for the “wrong 
answer”	condition pre and post-depletion. Moreover, as shown in Figure 15, there was an 
overall tendency toward a decrease in recollection bias parameters across all conditions after 
depletion. Further tests (Table 11) showed that this decrease was statistically significant in the 
control condition of the low depletion group and the “correct answer”	condition for both 
depletion groups. Meanwhile, the decrease was not significant for the	“wrong answer”	
condition of either depletion group.  
 
Reconstruction bias 
As indicated by the reconstruction parameter b, results from Table 10 show reconstruction 
bias is present to a significant degree in all conditions. The exact b values (with their 95% 
confidence intervals) for the high depletion group were 0.56 (±0.05), 0.45 (±0.07), 0.29 
(±0.06) and 0.53 (±0.05) for the condition labeled as “correct answer”	both pre and 
post-depletion and for the “wrong answer”	condition pre and post-depletion respectively. As 
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shown in Figure 15, the reconstruction bias parameters decreased for both experimental 
groups after depletion in the low depletion group. However, neither decrease was significant 
as demonstrated in Table 11. As for the high depletion group, a more intriguing pattern for the 
reconstruction parameter was found indicating a decrease in the “correct answer”	condition, 
but an increase in the	“wrong answer”	condition. Table 11 further shows that only the increase 
was significant through all conditions. In regard to the labeling effect indicated by the 
reconstruction parameter, the multinomial modeling analyses revealed the same results 
pattern as the conventional ANOVAs (thus, I will not discuss this point further).  
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Results on the response accuracy of the AB-AD task acted as manipulation checks.  
Specifically, the significant decrease in response accuracy of the high interference condition 
compared with that of the low interference condition across two depletion groups indicated 
the validity of the AB-AD task. Moreover, the significant increase in response accuracy after 
depletion procedure showed that the depletion procedure did work in Exp. 4. 
 
As with the percentage of correct OJs, the non-significance of the difference between two 
depletion intensity groups before depletion ensured that there was no difference in knowledge 
about the HB items for the two groups of participants.  
 
Regarding the perfect recall percentage during ROJ, results showed that participants assigned 
to the high depletion group did not remember their OJs significantly better or worse than their 
counterparts in the low depletion group. Furthermore, as the labeling effect in perfect recall 
percentage only existed after high depletion, we may surmise that participants only 
remembered their initial estimations worse after highly intensive cognitive tasks. This 
deterioration in performance was not dependent on the nature of later presented feedback, i.e., 
whether participants were provided with correct or incorrect answers to the questions. The 
main effect of depletion time (pre- vs. post-depletion) and results from further paired sample 
t-tests showed that while overall participants were less able to remember their OJs after 
depletion than prior to depletion, only those in the low depletion group performed 
significantly worse, and then only when feedback was labeled as “correct answer”. While we 
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might suspect this general decline in performance after depletion is due to lower motivation, 
the same column height of pre and post-depletion in the control condition in the high 
depletion group resists this interpretation (see Figure 13). Also, for the paired sample t-tests, I 
set the error probability to .05 instead of .01 for all other tests in the current study. When the 
significant value cut-off was set to .01, none of the above given t-tests for perfect recall 
percentage was at all significant.	Results	of	Figure	14	revealed	that the depletion procedure 
did work well on the delta-z measure of HB. More specifically, after intensively performing 
continuous tasks involving interference resistance ability, participants were significantly less 
biased when the feedback was labeled as “correct answer” as compared to their pre-depletion 
state. In contrast, they were significantly more biased toward the feedback if it was labeled 
“wrong answer”	after depletion. Note that this double-dissociation was only demonstrated in 
the high depletion group, and not in the low depletion group. 
 
When we switch the columns of Figure 13, the labeling effect3 is observed. Namely, 
compared to the control condition (i.e., no feedback), the magnitude of bias toward feedback 
is significantly larger in the condition labeled “correct answer”. However, the HB delta-z 
measure dropped significantly when feedback was labeled “wrong answer”, but was still 
significantly larger than in the control condition. The robustness of this labeling effect of the 
current experiment could be due to the within-subjects manipulation, instead of the 
between-subjects manipulation typically used in previous studies in which a much smaller 
labeling effect was found. Interestingly, this labeling effect was present in both groups, 
however, only before depletion. After depletion, the labeling effect disappeared, regardless of 
the depletion intensity. More specifically, while participants were still significantly more 
biased when feedback was presented, the bias did not differ whether this feedback was 
labeled as “correct answer” or “wrong answer”. 
 
At first glance, the disappearance of labeling effect after depletion perhaps invites the 
supposition that after depletion participants have lower motivation to focus on the task, but 
higher motivation to finish the task, thus ignoring the detailed nature of the feedback 
provided, i.e., how it is labeled. However, upon further deliberation of the results, several 
factors counter this initial response. First, if it were due to a problem of motivation, 
participants’ perfect recall percentage should also be influenced. However, as illustrated in 
                                                
3 I prefer the terminology of “labeling effect”	than “plausibility effect”	for the Exp.4, as no subjective 
plausibility was examined as what some previous studies did (Hardt & Pohl, 2003). 	
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Figure 13, the perfect recall rate did not differ significantly when we compare the item type 
conditions before and after depletion in almost all cases across both groups. Second, given the 
relative measure of HB, if it were due to a motivation problem participants should become 
more biased after depletion to an equal degree, regardless of the labeling condition. In fact, 
the dissociation pattern revealed that participants were significantly less biased after depletion 
when the feedback was labeled “correct answer”. Third, to further rule out the possibility of a 
motivation problem, the response time was thus checked. As shown in Table 9, participants 
did not differ significantly in their response time when completing the HB task after depletion 
as compared to before depletion, as indicated by the absence of the main effect of time (pre 
vs. post-depletion) across both groups and non-significant paired sample t values before and 
after depletion within each experimental condition. 
 
Taken together, the evidence suggests the depletion procedure could not have depleted 
participants’ motivation. Rather, some other fundamental mechanisms could have been 
fatigued, leading to the post-depletion dissociation pattern, i.e., significantly less bias when 
the given feedback was labeled as “correct answer” as in a typical HB situation; likewise, 
significantly more bias was present when the feedback offered was labeled “wrong answer”. 
As I hypothesized prior to the experiment, in the “correct answer” situation, the adaptive 
knowledge-updating process could be more involved yielding a substantial bias toward the 
feedback. As such, after depletion participants would allocate fewer cognitive resources to 
this process, and therefore less bias should be produced by the feedback. Similarly, in the 
situation in which items are labeled as “wrong answer”, the interference resistance process 
could be more involved resulting in relatively less bias. After depletion, fewer cognitive 
resources would be employed for this process, consequently leading to more bias toward the 
feedback. It should however be noted that the fundamental anchoring effect in both 
experimental conditions still existed, irrespective of how feedback was labeled. 
 
In summary, the hypotheses were supported by the results. The conventional ANOVAs 
showed that after depletion there were no significant differences in perfect recall percentage 
(see Figure 13). However, HB magnitude indicated by the proximity index was significantly 
altered after depletion (Figure 14). Moreover, comparison between pre and post-depletion 
conditions in high depletion group suggests that: 1) before depletion, participants’ HB were 
robust, regardless of how feedback was labeled, although less bias was present in the 
condition labeled “wrong answer”, and 2) after depletion, participants were less biased toward 
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the feedback when it was labeled “correct answer”, but more biased toward the feedback 
when it was labeled “wrong answer” (i.e., the single dissociation). 
 
When examined using multinomial modeling analyses, as shown in Figure 15, the 
recollection parameters were not significantly different between the two experimental 
conditions (i.e., no labeling effect with recollection bias parameters). This was inconsistent 
with previous studies in which discrediting manipulation had been applied; such work had 
found estimates of recollection bias parameter differed significantly between different 
discrediting groups (Hasher et al., 1981, Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998, Exp.3). This discrepancy 
could be due to different procedures being employed to those used in the current experiment, 
namely a 1-day retention interval instead of a 1-week gap in the other two studies, and the 
simultaneous presence of feedback and ROJs here rather than the separate presentation used 
in previous studies. Moreover, in the current experiment, feedback was presented as being the 
“correct answer” or “wrong answer” to a given question. In Erdfelder & Buchner (1998)’s 
Exp.3, however, participants in the feedback discrediting group were told that all the 
supposedly “correct answers” they received were wrong. Such manipulation may have led to 
a more powerful discrediting effect as participants could gain better access to their memory of 
OJs than those in the group without discrediting. 
 
Both methods of analysis showed a similar result pattern. Namely, the most heuristic response 
strategy of the HB memory task (i.e., direct recall) was not affected by depletion, suggesting 
that this strategy required only minimal cognitive resources. Thus, both the perfect recall 
percentage showed by ANOVAs and the recollection bias parameter estimations obtained 
from multinomial modeling analyses were no different before and after the depletion 
procedure. Instead, only the shift toward feedback measure and reconstruction bias parameter 
estimations differed significantly after depletion. Moreover, this difference could not be due 
to the longer retention interval between OJs and ROJs after depletion, because if this were so 
there would also be a significant difference in perfect recall percentage and recollection bias 
parameter estimations, which was not the case as discussed above. 
 
When we compare results obtained from the conventional ANOVAs with results from the 
multinomial modeling analyses, we see a divergent pattern in the high depletion group. More 
specifically, ANOVAs showed the difference in delta-z mean between pre and post-depletion 
was more significant in the condition labeled “correct answer” than in the condition labeled as 
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“wrong answer” (Figure 14). However, the multinomial analyses suggested that the difference 
in reconstruction bias parameter estimations between pre and post-depletion was only 
significant in the “wrong answer” condition (Figure 15). This inconsistent result pattern 
derived from two methods of analysis points to the advantage of multinomial modeling when 
applied to the HB paradigm. That is to say, the depletion procedure included tasks involving 
the interference resistance process. Thus, a specific interference resolution ability was 
supposedly more depleted, as opposed to general cognitive resources. Consequently, the 
condition labeled “wrong answer”, in which increased interference process was most relevant, 
could have been more depleted, leading to a more significant difference in the reconstruction 
bias parameter estimation. Quite apart from the superiority of multinomial analyses, the 
inconsistent results pattern could also be due to the different dependent variables adopted by 
the two analyzing methods, with the amount of shift or difference toward feedback (delta-z) in 
ANOVAs, and probability of reconstruction bias in multinomial modeling analyses. 
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3. General Discussion 
 
The current study was a theory-driven research in HB memory design, rather than a 
confirmatory project. The central goal was to explore the fundamental mechanisms 
underlying this robust cognitive phenomenon. I applied the ego-depletion philosophy on a 
proposed potential cognitive process related to HB, this being interference resistance. The 
pattern of depletion effect on HB was then obtained. The main aim was accomplished through 
a robust, step-by-step methodology. Prior to the experiment used to test the main idea, I 
conducted 2 experiments for task selection and to check manipulation.  
 
Experiment 1 confirmed the appropriate task type and detailed task structure for further 
application. The results of Exp.1 verified the interference effect using the classic retroactive 
interference task, i.e., AB-AD task by Müller & Pilzecker, 1900 (cited in Anderson & Neely, 
1996). More specifically, participants performed worse in recollection of the numbers from 
the first study list (word-number pairs) when they were also presented with a second study 
list, consisting of the same words paired with different numbers, as compared to when no 
such second study list was presented. Furthermore, although this typical retroactive 
interference effect existed in all conditions, a statistically significant effect was only 
demonstrated when 5 word-number pairs were included within one study list. Thus, the most 
appropriate length of word-number pairs for the interference task was confirmed. The 
significant increase in response time provided further support for the decreased recall 
performance when there was a similar second list to study, confirming that including 5 
word-number pairs within one study list would yield the greatest interference effect.  
Exp.2 checked the depletion manipulation based on Baumeister et al. (1998)’s ego depletion 
philosophy and Persson et al (2007)’s depletion technique. I used the verified AB-AD task as 
the transfer task before and after the depletion procedure, and three tasks requiring 
interference resistance from Persson et al. (2007) and Persson & Reuter-Lorenz (2008), these 
being a letter recognition task, an N-back task and a verb generation task as the training task 
during the depletion procedure. Consistent with my expectations, the results showed there 
was no difference in performance of the AB-AD task after depletion if participants went 
through the low depletion procedure, in which only conditions requiring minimal interference 
resistance ability were included in the training tasks. However, after participants went through 
the high depletion procedure, in which only conditions demanding high interference 
resistance ability were included, their performance in the AB-AD task was significantly 
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deteriorated. Furthermore, this performance deterioration only occurred in the condition when 
there was a second list to study. These results first proved the effect of the depletion 
procedure. They also confirmed that only a specific cognitive process, i.e., the interference 
resistance ability in the current study, was depleted, rather than general cognitive resources. A 
specific depletion nature of this kind was crucial for further experiment, as the intention was 
to determine whether the HB memory paradigm involves a specific interference resistance 
process. Therefore, the depletion procedure must work specifically on this process for us to 
apply it to a HB task. The results of Exp.2 provided the requisite affirmation of this. 
 
In the principal experiments of this study (Exp.3 and 4) I adopted the depletion procedure on 
the HB memory paradigm. Participants in Exp.3 were given a typical HB task including a 
control condition in which no feedback was presented and an experimental condition wherein 
the correct answer was present as feedback. I then compared HB magnitude in the pre and 
post-depletion phase, with participants going through either the low depletion procedure or 
the high depletion procedure. I was more interested in the difference in HB task performance 
in the high depletion group, while the low depletion group worked as a control baseline. 
Results of the ANOVAs on the perfect recall percentage and the shift measure of HB both 
indicated a decreasing trend in the high depletion group after depletion. More specifically, 
participants were less able to remember their previous estimations of answers after having 
performed intensive interference tasks demanding a high interference resistance process than 
they were beforehand. In situations where participants did not successfully recall their 
original estimations, there was a less biased trend in shift magnitude toward the feedback after 
depletion. Unfortunately, such results were neither statistically significant nor in line with the 
prior expectations. Prior to Exp.3, I offered the hypothesis that the interference resistance 
process was most probably involved in HB memory paradigm. In other words, during the 
recollection of previous judgments, the robust bias toward later presented feedback 
information could be due to the failure of resisting the interference induced by feedback 
information. Thus, after depletion of such interference resistance ability, people should be 
more biased toward the feedback; this ran counter to the results. I inferred then that the typical 
HB memory paradigm was more than just interference. There must be a certain process 
involved in HB that was crucially different to what we would observe in typical retroactive 
interference paradigm (such as the AB-AD task). Considering the difference between HB and 
the classic retroactive interference paradigm, the nature of later presented information in HB 
could play a fundamental role. That is, feedback in typical HB memory tasks are correct 
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answers to the questions. Thus, people are more adept at learning the feedback in an implicit 
and embedded way, resulting in the biased judgment toward the correct information when 
they are asked to recall their own initial judgment and when they fail to directly access the 
memory trace of their initial estimation. This bias could therefore be produced by updating 
their knowledge-base and be adaptive in the evolutionary aspect (Dekker, 2004). In turn, it 
was not the interference resistance process that was most fatigued in Exp.3. Rather, this 
knowledge-updating process was exhausted. Consequently, people were less influenced by 
feedback during their recollection of the original answers. As with the non-significance in the 
decreasing trend, a small sample size in Exp.3 may account for the low degree of significance. 
Thus, in the next experiment, the sample size was raised to increase the potential to attain a 
significant level of difference.  
 
In order to test post-hoc interpretation of Exp.3, I added one more experimental condition to 
the HB task in Exp.4. Namely, participants were presented with no feedback, or with 
feedback either labeled as “correct answer”	(as in Exp.3) or “wrong answer”	(new 
experimental condition in Exp.4). Combining this labeling manipulation with the depletion 
procedure, a clearer picture of what plays a leading role in HB memory paradigm is 
displayed. Results highly supported the hypotheses. The ANOVAs revealed no significant 
difference in participants’	perfect recall percentage after depletion in almost all conditions. 
Analyzing the shift measure, HB was still robust, indicated by the significant increase of 
delta-z mean in both experimental conditions (with feedback) compared with the control 
condition (no feedback), regardless of pre or post-depletion phases. Meanwhile, the shift 
measure was shown to be significantly smaller with the traditional “correct answer” labeled 
condition and larger in the “wrong answer”	condition after high depletion. Thus, although the 
same feedback values were presented, both leading to strong HB, different mechanisms could 
be underlying these outcomes when the feedback is labeled differently. As argued prior to 
conducting Exp.4, while a particular form of knowledge updating could play the primary and 
adaptive role in the typical HB situation (feedback labeled as “correct answer”), the 
interference resistance process may exert more influence when feedback is labeled as “wrong 
answer”. As a result, after depletion of different processes, the HB shift measure was 
influenced in different directions. The multinomial modeling analyses further supported the 
results pattern of the ANOVAs; this being, that after depletion, reconstruction bias parameter 
estimation decreased (showing less HB) in the condition labeled “correct answer”	condition 
but increased (showing more HB) in the condition labeled “wrong answer”. In addition, the 
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multinomial modeling analyses were more sensitive and accurate in their ability to detect 
nuances in the results. For example, while the shift measure ANOVAs showed that the 
differences with both experimental conditions were significant after depletion, the 
multinomial modeling analyses indicated that the reconstruction bias parameter estimation 
was only significantly different in the condition labeled “wrong answer”. The decrease in the 
condition labeled “correct answer”	was less and no longer significant after depletion. This is 
consistent with the fact that the depletion procedure targeted the interference resistance 
process rather than other more general cognitive resources. In the condition labelled "wrong 
answer", the interference resistance process dominated.  This process was subsequently 
depleted more than other cognitive processes via the current depletion procedure, leading to a 
significant increase in the bias toward the feedback. 
 
When comparing pre and post-depletion in Exp.3 (the traditional HB situation) with the 
condition labeled “correct answer”	in Exp.4, results are in line with knowledge-updating 
theories in previous studies (for a review, see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). This strand of theory 
asserts that outcome information updates the knowledge-base from which the initial judgment 
is drawn. Subsequent reconstruction is therefore based on the freshly updated knowledge-base 
if direct recall strategy fails. As a result, the reconstructed judgment is biased toward the 
outcome information, i.e., hindsight bias. In Exp.3, the depletion procedure produced fewer 
cognitive resources demanded by such knowledge-updating behavior, causing a decreasing 
trend in the bias. The knowledge-updating notion is the only line of existing theory that could 
explain such a decrease. The condition labeled “correct answer”	in Exp.4 provided further 
confirmation of this interpretation.  
 
As with the comparison between different labeling of the two experimental conditions (either 
correct or wrong answer of the question) prior to the depletion procedure in Exp.4, results 
supported the anchoring theory and plausibility effect of HB (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; 
Pohl, 1998a; Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998 and Hardt & Pohl, 2003). Namely, compared with 
the control condition (no feedback), participants still biased hindsight to a robust degree even 
though feedback was explicitly labeled as “wrong answer”. It suggests that people may still 
anchor to presented information while they attempt to reconstruct their initial answer to a 
question. However, as compared to the condition labelled “correct answer”, the magnitude of 
HB was significantly less in the “wrong answer”	condition. In the former situation, 
participants could engage in more integrating behavior (e.g., knowledge-updating or 
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anchoring), whilst in the latter case, more gating behavior is involved. It has not however 
been uniformly clarified in previous research when and how such gating behavior occurs. 
That is, it could be that participants employ inhibition process early in the presentation of 
outcome information due to the “wrong”	labeling of it. Also, previous research does not rule 
out the possibility that suppression only occurs after the outcome information has entered 
working memory or episodic memory (varying according to the retention interval between CJ 
and ROJ), and has consequently updated the initial knowledge-base. During reconstruction of 
the initial judgment, people would then have to resist the interference induced by the 
feedback, i.e., less anchoring. Taken together however, different labeling conditions make an 
observable difference in the extent to which people are biased toward feedback.  
 
The plausibility operation varied the nature of feedback information at the two ends of the 
spectrum, either right or wrong. This was a more powerful manipulation than that used in 
some previous studies, e.g., Pohl (1998)’s labeling of the feedback as “another person’s 
answer”. In previous studies that explicitly told participants feedback was wrong (Hasher et 
al., 1981, Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998), this information was only presented after participants 
had initially encoded feedback as the correct answer. The timing of plausibility manipulation 
could be critical in that the inhibition process might have occurred early during the 
presentation of outcome information. Therefore, a more salient plausibility effect was 
demonstrated in Exp.4.  
 
Aside from plausibility effect, the comparison of the results of pre and post-depletion in the 
condition labeled “wrong answer”	in Exp.4 provided further evidence of inhibition theory 
explaining HB. This line of theory is typically suggested by developmental studies in HB 
(Bayen et al., 2006, Pohl & Haracic, 2005, Pohl et al., 2010). Through a lifespan, both HB 
and inhibition-related abilities exhibit the same form of U-shaped function, only in a reversed 
pattern, with young children and older adults being at the two ends of the curve and younger 
adults in the lowest middle point with HB. As discussed, the condition labeled “wrong 
answer”	could enlarge the extent to which inhibition process is involved in HB. In addition, 
the depletion procedure was specifically tailored to fatigue the interference resistance process. 
After such depletion, people should have less cognitive resources to engage in the inhibition 
process, resulting in more HB, which was exactly what the results of Exp.4 illustrated. 
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However, the current results clearly did not support any of these single process theories, 
especially indicated by the dissociation with the two HB experimental conditions in Exp.4. It 
could be argued that the strong plausibility manipulation has changed the typical nature of HB 
phenomenon in the “wrong answer”	condition. If so, this condition would be nothing more 
than a normal anchoring paradigm, rather than HB. However, the results of Exp.4 showed that 
there was still robust HB in the condition labeled	“wrong answer”	across both groups and 
phases. That is, although feedback information was strongly discredited, a considerable 
amount of HB could still be elicited. Thus, both experimental conditions in Exp.4 could be 
considered as variations of the HB paradigm. Consequently, different magnitudes of HB 
between the two conditions before depletion and different trends in direction after depletion 
suggest the inadequacy of a single process theory explaining HB. There should be more than 
one process involved in the HB memory paradigm that is mitigated by the depletion 
procedure, eventually leading to the adverse direction of the difference, albeit via the same 
depletion technique. 
 
Another feature of the current results that cannot be overlooked is the control aspect. As 
discussed previously in regard to the principle of ego depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998), 
fatigue after intensively performing certain tasks acts only on controlled activities that require 
active guidance of self-control, but not on simpler and automatic activities in which no 
engagement of cognitive resource is demanded. Both Exp.3 and Exp.4 revealed effective 
depletion effect suggesting that the underlying processes of the HB paradigm are controlled 
behaviors demanding cognitive resource to function. This notion is inconsistent with a 
number of previous theories. Some of these theories overtly assert that an automatic 
assimilation is involved during presentation of outcome information inducing the biased 
post-outcome judgments of pre-outcome estimations (Fischhoff, 1975), while other theories4 
do not specify the controlled nature of the underlying processes of HB, e.g., SARA model 
(Pohl et al., 2003).  
 
Taken together, I would propose a dual-process framework for HB memory paradigm, 
including two parallel processes –	interference resistance and adaptive knowledge updating –	
that are both controlled (Figure 16). As shown in Figure 16, the magnitude of HB (the vertical 
coordinate) is modulated by the amount of the involvement of these two processes. The 
                                                
4	 Again, as I applied the HB memory task using almanac questions for the current study, only theories 
relating to this specific HB paradigm are included in discussion of current study.	
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horizontal coordinate denotes the dimension of influencing elements, generating the relative 
engagement extent of the two underlying mechanisms. Taking the current experiments as an 
example, the horizontal dimension would be feedback plausibility. More specifically, with 
conditions in which feedback is highly plausible (e.g., being the correct answer of one 
question), more knowledge updating behavior would be invested, leading to a large HB 
magnitude. In contrast, when the feedback is highly implausible (e.g., being the wrong answer 
of the question), the horizontal dimension is pulled to the right, i.e., more interference 
resistance action would be elicited, resulting in smaller HB below the baseline amount. 
However, it is hard to fully eliminate HB. With other manipulations or other situations, the 
horizontal dimension could be some other factors, e.g., the accessibility of the initial 
estimation, etc., which was not empirically demonstrated in the current experiments. 
Furthermore, both processes are controlled rather than automatic, demanding a certain amount 
of cognitive resources to accomplish. 
 
Results of the Exp.3 and 4 provide empirical support for the theoretical dual process 
framework. With Exp.3, the typical HB paradigm was employed, where CJ is presented as 
“correct answer” of the question for the experimental items. According to the dual process 
account, knowledge updating behavior was taking the dominant role during ROJ, thus resulting 
in robust HB. The depletion procedure correspondingly fatigued the knowledge updating 
behavior and yielded a decreased HB (descriptively). Further with Exp.4, for experimental 
items of HB task, CJ is either presented as “correct answer” (as in Exp.3) or labeled as “wrong 
answer” of the question. Thus, although there was an “answer” appeared on the screen when 
participants were required to give their ROJ, this “answer” was supposed to be “wrong 
answer”. Consequently, participants were more likely to engage in inhibitory behavior with 
“wrong answer” HB items, so that they would not influence their direct recall of OJ from 
memory, and/or would not interfere with their reconstruction process of the OJ.  Less 
cognitive resource would be assigned for any knowledge updating behavior resulting in the 
labeling effect of HB before depletion. After depletion, the cognitive resource that was 
supposed to be allocated for interference resistance process was cut short. HB magnitude was 
then increased after depletion. 
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Figure 16. A refined framework of the dual-process account of HB memory paradigm. 
 
 
Aside from the controlled nature of the two processes, I would also argue that with the current 
framework “interference resistance”	and “knowledge updating”	cannot be seen as merely two 
sides of the same coin. It is more likely that they are two parallel independent processes, with 
one taking the dominant role under most conditions. There are extreme cases in which the 
feedback is surprising and the accessibility of the initial estimation is high (e.g., short 
retention interval between OJ and ROJ); in such instances people could still engage in 
knowledge updating while rather effectively resisting the interference of the outcome, 
resulting in a less biased ROJ and reaching a near baseline level of HB. These extreme cases 
suggest that interference resistance and knowledge updating are more than just different 
means of interpreting HB. Instead, there are two possibilities of how these two processes 
function in this dynamic framework. First, they could function independently as long as there 
are sufficient cognitive resources, a contention that the depletion results lend weight to. 
Specifically, if they merely represented the same fundamental idea from varying perspectives, 
HB under two experimental conditions (labeled “correct answer”	or “wrong answer” 
respectively) should be influenced by the depletion procedure in the same direction (both 
increasing or both decreasing). Consequently, a middle level of HB magnitude could be 
reached with both conditions after depletion. However, the dissociation I found counters such 
an argument. As such, there must be two processes that are separately depleted with respect to 
different situations, either one of which may take the dominant role. The second possibility of 
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how these two processes function takes the form of a lever that adjusts the final magnitude of 
HB (see Figure 17). The right hand of the lever could be regulated by interference resistance 
ability while the left hand is accommodated by knowledge updating behavior. In this way, the 
two underlying processes may influence each other. Higher interference resistance ability 
could lead to less knowledge updating behavior, and consequently less HB. This second 
solution is a more dynamic possibility of how the two processes interact. Nevertheless, the 
current study was unable to rule out either possibility, and I therefore could not determine the 
precise mode of dynamic function operating between these two underlying processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. A refined framework of the dual-process account of HB memory paradigm (alternative 
dynamic). 
 
 
For an interim short summary, the dual-process framework is superior to previous theories 
explaining HB memory paradigm in the following three respects. First, it acknowledges and 
adopts two processes as jointly producing HB rather than attributing the phenomenon to a 
single theory. In doing so it renders a compelling explanation for some of the critical findings 
about HB that could not be explained by previous theories. For example, the assimilation and 
knowledge updating theory alone cannot explain the difference in HB between children, 
younger adults and older adults in developmental findings. Likewise, inhibition theory by 
itself cannot explain the depletion effect with the typical HB condition, i.e., feedback labeled 
as “correct answer”. Furthermore, the more sophisticated SARA model does not offer a 
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conscientious elucidation of plausibility effect in previous studies and the quite robust 
labeling effect seen in the current experiment. Thus, by not overlooking the influence of either 
of the two crucial processes, the current account offers a dynamic framework that explains 
HB from a more flexible, nuanced perspective. 
 
Secondly, the controlled nature that is attributed to the framework, which is not proposed in 
any previous theory, is found in two respects. Both processes can be controlled to engage at 
varying levels under different circumstances. After situations are evaluated meta-cognitively, 
the two processes would then be distributed with a different weight of engagement, resulting 
in a certain amount of HB. Both processes are controlled, as opposed to automatic, and 
demand cognitive resources to function. They can be fatigued through intensive performance 
of certain related tasks, and could likely be improved through regular training in such tasks; 
the former claim here was empirically supported by the current experiments, while future 
research can examine the latter proposition using training procedures. Thus, thirdly, by 
specifying these two underlying processes, the current theory provides exclusive direction for 
any future training study, i.e., either structuring training to improve people’s interference 
resistance ability or constructing situations to prevent them updating their original 
knowledge-base if the intention is to reduce HB.  
 
Despite the advantages of the current framework vis-à-vis previous theories discussed above, 
I acknowledge there are certain limitations and flaws in the current study. Firstly, I used 
general knowledge questions requiring numerical judgments as materials; thus, the theoretical 
conclusions drawn from the current results are limited in their application to this specific type 
of HB. In both research literature and real life contexts however, various types of HB exist. 
The current theory could not provide insight into paradigms other than the memory distortion 
mode.  
 
Secondly, the labeling effect applied in the current study was situated on the two extremities 
of the plausibility dimension, i.e., correct answer being extremely plausible and wrong answer 
being highly implausible. Thus, we obtained a rather robust labeling effect implying the 
obvious difference in the involvement of each process under corresponding conditions, i.e., 
dominant knowledge updating engagement when feedback is labeled as “correct answer”	of 
the question on the one hand, and the overriding role of interference resistance in the 
condition labelled “wrong answer”	on the other. However, the relative flowing dynamic in the 
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middle was not examined by the current study. Future research could vary the feedback 
plausibility to allow for divergence in intensity, e.g., labeling the feedback as “another 
person’s estimation”	as in Pohl (1998), or “random number”. When combined with the 
depletion procedure, we could test whether the engagement of underlying processes of HB 
follows the dynamic entailed by the current framework. Moreover, although I adopted a rather 
strong manipulation of labeling effect, the genuine plausibility effect bearing on participants 
was not explicitly measured. Thus, in future research, subjective plausibility would be better 
tested using either an opening questionnaire or a rating assessment (Pohl & Gawlik, 1995; 
Werth, 2002).  
 
Thirdly, according to Ash (2009), HB is not a single time-point psychological phenomenon, 
but rather a hybrid of different processes; that is, people making a predictive estimation, 
followed by outcome information influencing their retrospective judgment about their initial 
prediction. Thus, a complete HB theory should explain all three processes. The current theory 
is unfortunately not complete in that sense. I am unable to draw any conclusions about when 
the two fundamental processes occur and their weight of involvement due to the experimental 
set-up, i.e., presenting CJ, labeling of CJ and ROJ requirement on the same screen. I would 
assume that both knowledge updating and interference resistance are principally active during 
the feedback presentation phase. The subsequent post-feedback recall would then be based on 
the updated knowledge-base. However, people may still try to resist the interference brought 
about by drawing judgment from the new knowledge-base, especially under situations with 
high accessibility to the original estimation, or with a high meta-cognitive consciousness of 
the HB concept, i.e., knowledge of the bias. The results and the theory of current study could 
not shed any light on this aspect of the problem. Thus, I am unable to distinguish when either 
of the two processes or both of them come to play their roles and how engaged people are. 
Future research could try to deconstruct and discern the interplay of these two processes 
during different phases by exerting corresponding manipulations with separate feedback 
presentation, feedback discrediting and recollection requirement.  
 
Moreover, little weight has been given to the involvement of interference-related function, 
aside from in developmental studies on HB. While the current theory addresses the value of 
such function, it is unable to determine the precise occurrence timing of the interference 
resistance behavior. More specifically, when feedback is evaluated as being implausible, it 
could be inhibited either by gating before encoding during the feedback presentation phase, or 
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by suppression after it is encoded and has entered the working memory during the 
re-judgment phase. This uncertainty remains unresolved. Future work could seek to illuminate 
this issue through a recognition test on the feedback. There should be some difference in the 
performance of feedback recognition between different labeling conditions (correct or wrong 
answer of the question) if the inhibition occurs early in the feedback presentation phase. In 
contrast, if it occurs mainly in the subsequent re-judgment phase, there should be no such 
difference. 
 
I also suggest future research could apply manipulations to test other potential factors of 
influence in the horizontal dimensions of the current framework. For example, high 
accessibility of the original judgment could lead to considerable engagement of interference 
resistance behavior, in spite of substantial knowledge updating activity taking place at the 
same time because of our ability to adapt and absorb new information. However, the latter 
process could not be very influential in this situation, yielding a small HB, i.e., re-judgment 
from the blend of the previous knowledge-base and the updated one due to the partly effective 
participation of the interference resistance process.  
 
To conclude, the current study was a theory-driven research on HB memory paradigm. I 
explored the underlying mechanisms of HB step by step through the combination of a 
labeling manipulation and a depletion procedure. Stemming from the current results, I 
propose a dual-process theory to explain HB. The refining knowledge updating process 
results from the enormous volume of everyday knowledge acquisition we experience in daily 
life; as a consequence, swift and ongoing update of our knowledge-base is ecologically 
necessary. Notwithstanding this, when a situation requires individuals to recollect an initial 
estimation that differs markedly from the correct answer, they then attempt to exert the 
corresponding executive functions (i.e., interference resistance) to overcome the influence of 
the adaptive updating inclination. The current theory offers an adaptable dynamic framework 
of HB making it more progressive than previous theories. More specifically, the underlying 
processes are not fixed, but flexible in terms of the timing and weight of their occurrence. 
Also, they can be subjectively controlled and regulated according to the objective and 
perceived state. This is crucial in the sense that hindsight bias is not a bias of lengthy 
evolutionary terms, but a result of an adaptive ecological function. 
 	
90		 	
 
References 
Anderson, M. C., & Neely, J. H. (1996). Interference and Inhibition in Memory Retrieval.  
In Memory. Handbook of Perception and Cognition (2nd edn) (Bjork, E. L. and Bjork, R. 
A., eds), pp. 237 - 313, Academic Press.  
Arkes, H. R. (2013). The Consequences of the Hindsight Bias in Medical Decision Making. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(5), 356–360.  
Arkes, H.R., Wortmann, R. L., Saville, P. D., & Harkness, A. R. (1981). Hindsight bias 
among physicians weighing the likelihood of diagnoses. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
66(2), 252-254. 
Ash, I. K. (2009). Surprise, memory, and retrospective judgment making: testing cognitive 
reconstruction theories of the hindsight bias effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35(4), 916–33.  
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: is the 
active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(5), 
1252–65.  
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Tice, D. M. (2007). The Strength Model of, 16(6), 351–
356. 
Bayen, U. J., Erdfelder, E., Bearden, J. N., & Lozito, J. P. (2006). The interplay of memory 
and judgment processes in effects of aging on hindsight bias. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32(5), 1003–18.  
Bernstein, D. M., Atance, C., Loftus, G. R., & Meltzoff, A. (2004). We saw it all along: visual 
hindsight bias in children and adults. Psychological Science, 15(4), 264–7.  
Bernstein, D. M., Atance, C., Meltzoff, A. N., & Loftus, G. R. (2007). Hindsight bias and 
developing theories of mind. Child Development, 78(4), 1374–94. 
Blank, H., Musch, J., & Pohl, R. F. (2007). Hindsight Bias: On Being Wise After the Event. 
Social Cognition, 25(1), 1–9.  
91		 	
 
Blank, H. & Nestler, S. (2006). Perceiving events as both inevitable and unforeseeable in 
hindsight: The leipzig candidacy for the olympics.  British Jourmal of Social 
Psychology, 45 (1), 149 - 160.  
Blank, H., & Nestler, S. (2007). Cognitive Process Models of Hindsight Bias. Social 
Cognition, 25(1), 132–146.  
Blank, H., Nestler, S., von Collani, G., & Fischer, V. (2008). How many hindsight biases are 
there? Cognition, 106(3), 1408–40.  
Carlson, S. M., & Moses, L. J. (2001). Individual Differences in Inhibitory Control and 
Children’s Theory of Mind. Child Development, 72(4), 1032–1053.  
Choi, D., & Choi, I. (2010). A comparison of hindsight bias in groups and individuals: The 
moderating role of plausibility. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 325–343.  
Christensen-Szalanski, J. J. ., & Willham, C. F. (1991). The hindsight bias: A meta-analysis. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 48(1), 147–168.  
Coolin, A., Bernstein, D. M., Thornton, A. E., & Thornton, W. L. (2014). Age differences in 
hindsight bias: The role of episodic memory and inhibition. Experimental Aging 
Research, 40, 357–374. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/0361073X.2014.896667  
Coolin, A., Erdfelder, E., Bernstein, D. M., Thornton, A. E., & Thornton, W. L. (2014). 
Explaining individual differences in cognitive processes underlying hindsight bias. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. Advance online publication. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-014-0691-5 
Dehn, D. M. & Erdfelder, E. (1998). What kind of bias is hindsight bias? Psychological 
Research, 61 (2), 135 - 146.  
Dekker, S. W. A. (2004). The hindsight bias is not a bias and not about history Sidney W . A . 
Dekker Technical Report 2004-01 Lund University School of Aviation. 
Eisenhauer, M (2000). Selektive Aktivierung als Erklärung des Rückschaufehlers. 
Unpublished Dissertation, University of Trier.  
Erdfelder, E. (2000).  Multinomiale Modelle in der kognitiven Psychologie. 
92		 	
 
Habilitationsschrift zur Erlangung der Lehrbefugnis im Fach Psychologie an der 
Philosophischen Fakultät der Rheinischen Freidrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Bonn. 
Bonn. 
Erdfelder, E., Auer, T.-S., Hilbig, B. E., Aßfalg, A., Moshagen, M., & Nadarevic, L. (2009). 
Multinomial Processing Tree Models. Zeitschrift Für Psychologie / Journal of 
Psychology, 217(3), 108–124. 
Erdfelder, E., Brandt, M. & Broder, A. (2007). Recollection biases in hindsight judgments. 
Social Cognition, 25(1), 114-131. 
Erdfelder, E., & Buchner, A. (1998).  Decomposing the hindsight bias: A multinomial 
processing tree model for separating recollection and reconstruction in hindsight. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 24(2), 387–
414.  
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: a flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 39(2), 175–91.  
Fessel, F., Epstude, K., & Roese, N. J. (2009). Hindsight bias redefined: It’s about time. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 110(1), 56–64.  
Fischer, I. & Budescu, D. V. (1995). Desirability and hindsight biases in predicting results of 
a multi-party election. In J. P. Caverni, M. Bar-Hillel, F. H. Barron & H. Jungermann   
(Eds.), Contributions to decision making (Bd. 1, pp. 193–211). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Fischhoff, B. (1975). Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on 
judgment under uncertainty.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 1 (3), 288 - 299. 
 
Fischhoff, B. (1977). Perceived informativeness of facts. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 3 (2), 349 - 358.  
Fischhoff, B., & Beyth, R. (1975). “ I Knew It Would Happen ”: Remembered probabilities of 
once-future things.  Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance, 13 (1), 1 - 16.   
93		 	
 
Gailliot, M. T., Plant, E. A., Butz, D. a, & Baumeister, R. F. (2007). Increasing 
self-regulatory strength can reduce the depleting effect of suppressing stereotypes. 
Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(2), 281–94.  
Groß, J., & Bayen, U. J. (2015). Hindsight bias in younger and older adults: The role of access 
control. Aging, Neuropsychology, & Cognition, online. doi: 10.1080/13825585.2014.901289 
Guilbault, R., Bryant, F., Brockway, J. H., & Posavac, E. (2004). A Meta-Analysis of 
Research on Hindsight Bias. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 26(2), 103–117.  
Hardt, O., & Pohl, R. (2003). Hindsight bias as a function of anchor distance and anchor 
plausibility. Memory, 11(4-5), 379–394. 
Harley, E. M. (2007). Hindsight Bias In Legal Decision Making. Social Cognition, 25(1), 48–
63.  
Harley, E. M., Carlsen, K. a, & Loftus, G. R. (2004). The “saw-it-all-along” effect: 
demonstrations of visual hindsight bias. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 30(5), 960–8.  
Hasher, L., Attig, M., & Alba, J. (1981). I knew it all along: or, did I? Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20(1), 86–96.  
Hawkins, S. a., & Hastie, R. (1990). Hindsight: Biased judgments of past events after the 
outcomes are known. Psychological Bulletin, 107(3), 311–327. 
doi:10.1037//0033-2909.107.3.311 
Hell, W., Gigerenzer, G., Gauggel, S., Mall, M., & Müller, M. (1988). Hindsight bias: an 
interaction of automatic and motivational factors? Memory & Cognition, 16(6), 533–8.  
Henriksen, K., & Kaplan, H. (2003). Hindsight bias, outcome knowledge and adaptive 
learning.  
Hertwig, R., Fanselow, C., & Hoffrage, U. (2003). Hindsight bias: How knowledge and 
heuristics affect our reconstruction of the past. Memory, 11(4-5), 357–377.  
Hertwig, R., Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1997). The reiteration effect in hindsight bias. 
Psychological Review, 104(1), 194–202. 
94		 	
 
Hoffrage, U., Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (2000). Hindsight Bias : A By-Product of 
Knowledge Updating ? Cognition, 26(3), 566–581.  
Hölzl, E., & Kirchler, E. (2005). Causal attribution and hindsight bias for economic 
developments. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(1), 167–74.  
Kane, M. J., Core, T. J., & Hunt, R. R. (2010). Bias versus bias: harnessing hindsight to 
reveal paranormal belief change beyond demand characteristics. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 17(2), 206–12. 
Louie, T. a., Rajan, M. N., & Sibley, R. E. (2007). Tackling the Monday-Morning 
Quarterback: Applications of Hindsight Bias in Decision-Making Settings. Social 
Cognition, 25(1), 32–47. 
Moshagen, M. (2010). multiTree: a computer program for the analysis of multinomial 
processing tree models. Behavior Research Methods, 42(1), 42–54.  
Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: 
Does self-control resemble a muscle? Psychological Bulletin, 126(2), 247–259.  
Musch, J. (2003). Personality differences in hindsight bias. Memory (Hove, England), 
11(4-5), 473–89.  
Musch, J., & Wagner, T. (2007). Did Everybody Know It All Along? A Review of Individual 
Differences in Hindsight Bias. Social Cognition, 25(1), 64–82.  
Nestler, S., Blank, H. & Collani, G. (2008).  Hindsight bias and causal attribution: A causal 
model theory of creeping determinism. Social Psychology, 39 (3), 182 - 188.  
Persson, J., & Reuter-Lorenz, P. A. (2008). Gaining Control: Training executive function and 
far transfer of the ability to Resolve Interference.  Psychological Sceince, 19(9), 881–
888. 
Persson, J., Welsh, K. M., Jonides, J., & Reuter-Lorenz, P. a. (2007). Cognitive fatigue of 
executive processes: interaction between interference resolution tasks. 
Neuropsychologia, 45(7), 1571–9.  
95		 	
 
Pezzo, M. V. (2003).  Surprise, defense, or making sense: What removes hindsight bias? 
Memory, 11 (4-5), 421 - 441.  
Pezzo, M. V, & Beckstead, J. W. (2008). The Effects of Disappointment on Hindsight Bias 
for Real-World Outcomes. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 506(June 2007), 491–506.  
Pezzo, M. V., & Pezzo, S. P. (2007). Making Sense of Failure: A Motivated Model of 
Hindsight Bias. Social Cognition, 25(1), 147–164.  
Pieters, R., Baumgartner, H., & Bagozzi, R. (2006). Biased memory for prior decision 
making: Evidence from a longitudinal field study. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 99(1), 34–48.  
Pohl, R. F. (1992). Der Rückschaufehler: Systematische Verfälschung der Erinnerung bei 
Experten und Novizen.  Kognitionswissenschaft, 3 (1), 38 - 44.  
Pohl, R. F. (1995). Disenchanting hindsight bias.  In J. P. Caverni, M. Bar-Hillel, F. H. 
Barron & H. Jungermann (Eds.), Contributions to decition making (Bd. 1, pp. 323 - 334). 
Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
Pohl, R. F. (1998). The effects of feedback source and plausibility of hindsight bias. 
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 10 (2), 191 - 212.  
Pohl, R. F. (2004). Hindsight bias.  In R. F. Pohl (Ed.), Cognitive illusions: A handbook on 
fallacies and biases in thinking, judgment and memory (p. 363 - 378).  Hove, UK: 
Psycholgoy Press.  
Pohl, R. F. (2007). Ways to Assess Hindsight Bias. Social Cognition, 25(1), 14–31.  
Pohl, R. F., Bayen, U. J., & Martin, C. (2010). A multiprocess account of hindsight bias in 
children. Developmental Psychology, 46(5), 1268–82. 
Pohl, R. F., Bender, M., & Lachmann, G. (2002). Hindsight Bias Around the World. 
Experimental Psychology.  
Pohl, R. F., Eisenhauer, M., & Hardt, O. (2003). SARA: A cognitive process model to 
simulate the anchoring effect and hindsight bias. Memory, 11(4-5), 337–356.  
96		 	
 
Pohl, R. F., & Gawlik, B. (1995). Hindsight bias and the misinformation effect: separating 
blended recollections from other recollection types. Memory (Hove, England), 3(1), 21–
55.  
Pohl, R. F. & Haracic, I. (2005). Der Rückschaufehler bei Kindern und Erwachsenen. 
Zeitschrift Für Entwicklungspsychologie Und Pädagogische Psychologie, 37(1), 46–55.  
Pohl, R. F. & Hell, W. (1996). No reduction in hindsight bias after complete information and 
repeated testing. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67 (1), 49 - 
58.  
Raaijmakers, J. G. W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1980).  SAM: A theory of probabilistic search of 
associative memory.  In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psycholgoy of learning and motivation 
(Bd. 14, p. 207 - 262). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.  
Renner, B. (2003). Hindsight bias after receiving self-relevant health risk information: A 
motivational perspective. Memory, 11(4), 455–472.  
Roberts, K. P., & Powell, M. B. (2005). The relation between inhibitory control and 
children’s eyewitness memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19(8), 1003–1018.  
Salthouse, T. a., & Babcock, R. L. (1991). Decomposing adult age differences in working 
memory. Developmental Psychology, 27(5), 763–776.  
Sanna, L. J., & Schwarz, N. (2007). Metacognitive Experiences and Hindsight Bias: It’s Not 
Just the Thought (Content) That Counts! Social Cognition, 25(1), 185–202.  
Schmeichel, B. J., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2003). Intellectual performance and ego 
depletion: Role of the self in logical reasoning and other information processing. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(1), 33–46.  
Schwarz, S., & Stahlberg, D. (2003). Strength of hindsight bias as a consequence of 
meta-cognitions. Memory (Hove, England), 11(4-5), 395–410.  
Smith, H. D. (1999). Use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic by children. Current 
Psychology, 18(3), 294–300. 
97		 	
 
Stahlberg, D. (1994). Der Knew-it-all-Along-Effekt: Eine urteilstheoretische Erklärung.  
Unpublished Habilitationsschrift.  University of Kiel.  
Stahlberg, D. & Maass, A. (1997). Hindsight bias: Impaired memory or biased 
reconstruction? European Review of Social Psychology, 8, 105 - 132.  
Strack, F., & Mussweiler, T. (1997). Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms 
of selective accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social …, 73(3), 437–446.  
Tykocinski, O. E., Pick, D., & Kedmi, D. (2002). Retroactive pessimism : a different kind of 
hindsight bias. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 577–588. 
Wasserman, D., Lempert, R. O. & Hastie, R. (1991). Hindsight and causality.  Personality 
and Social Psycholgoy Bulletin, 17 (1), 30 - 35.  
Werth, L. (2002). Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces of the Hindsight Bias. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 87(2), 323–341.  
Winman, A., Juslin, P. & Bjorkman, M. (1998).  The confidence-hindsight mirror effect in 
judgment: An accuracy-assessment model for the knew-it-all-along phenomenon.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 24 (2), 415 - 
431.  
Wood, G. (1978). The knew-it-all-along effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 4(2), 345–353.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98		 	
 
Appendix A 
 
Raw Response Category Frequencies for Exp. 3  
 
 
Response 
Category  
Low depletion High depletion 
Ctrl Exp  Ctrl Exp  
Pre  Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post  
ROJ<OJ<CJ 90 67 61 59 78 82 53 54 
ROJ=OJ<CJ 108 136 111 107 161 153 142 147 
OJ<ROJ<CJ 85 95 98 133 69 69 101 110 
OJ<ROJ=CJ 1 3 0 7 0 4 3 3 
OJ<CJ<ROJ 36 40 51 50 25 30 20 30 
CJ<OJ<ROJ 48 53 29 30 41 36 16 26 
CJ<ROJ=OJ 68 62 67 60 97 87 94 76 
CJ<ROJ<OJ 62 33 86 59 36 39 72 62 
ROJ=CJ<OJ 0 3 2 5 0 3 2 3 
ROJ<CJ<OJ 45 46 36 37 27 31 34 24 
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Appendix B 
 
Raw Response Category Frequencies for Exp. 4  
 
 
Response 
Category  
Low depletion High depletion 
Ctrl. CCJ WCJ Ctrl. CCJ WCJ 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
ROJ<OJ<CJ 110 103 45 56 72 75 90 99 55 70 75 65 
ROJ=OJ<CJ 193 178 209 164 185 162 202 217 194 167 197 171 
OJ<ROJ<CJ 86 109 210 215 153 151 103 105 166 163 145 162 
OJ<ROJ=CJ 2 4 5 7 13 21 3 2 2 6 7 3 
OJ<CJ<ROJ 28 42 26 38 48 67 35 26 27 38 43 34 
CJ<OJ<ROJ 72 50 27 22 31 28 66 51 22 29 44 35 
CJ<ROJ=OJ 132 99 105 99 108 113 108 97 120 107 120 107 
CJ<ROJ<OJ 39 56 80 92 80 78 56 63 88 114 93 99 
ROJ=CJ<OJ 2 2 6 5 8 6 4 1 2 1 8 6 
ROJ<CJ<OJ 39 56 60 65 56 45 40 48 75 62 38 70 
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Appendix C 
 
HB bias items used in Experiment 3 and 4 
 
1. Wie alt wurde Goethe?  82 Jahre 
2. Wie lang war die laengste nachgewiesene menschliche Hand?   32m 
3. Wie gross ist das Volument des Vierwaldstaettersees?    12km3 
4. Wie lange dauert die Schwanerschaft von Fuechsen?    52 Tage 
5. Wie hoch ist die Freiheitsstatue (mit Sockel)?      93m 
6. Wie viele Kapitel haben die drei “Herr der Ringe” Baende (ohne Anhaenge) insgesamt?    
62 
7. Wie viele Meter ueber dem Meeresspiegel liegt die Ortsmitte von Duesseldorf?  36m 
8. Wie lang ist die kuerzere Seite eines Zehn-Euro Scheins?    67mm 
9. Wie alt wurde Mozart?     35 Jahre 
10. Wie viel kg Gefluegel verzehrt ein Bundesbuerger pro Jahr?    18kg 
11. Wie lang war das laengste nachgewiesene menschliche Beinhaar?  12cm 
12. Wie hoch war der hoechste Sprung eines Schweins?  70cm 
13. Wie gross ist das Volumen des Bodensees?    48 km3 
14. Wie lange dauert die Schwangerschaft von Koalas?    35 Tage 
15. Auf welchem Laengengrad liegt Budapest?   19 
16. Wie viele Felder hat ein Mensch-aergere-dich-nicht-Spiel fuer 4 Personen (inclusive 
Start- und Zielfeldern)?  72 
17. Wie lang kann der Gemeine Regenwurm warden?   30cm 
18. Bis zu wie viele Fluegelschlaege macht ein Kolibri pro Sekunde?   50 
19. Wie hoch war der Pkw- Bestand in Deutschland in Januar 2004?  45 Millionen 
20. In welchem Jahr wurde Nelson Mandela geboren?  1918 
21. Wie viele kg Zucker verbraunchte jeder Deutsche durchschnittlich in 2000?  33 
22. Wie lang ist das laengste Fahhrad der Welt?   28m 
23. Wie viele Junge wirft ein Wildkaninchen durchschnittlich pro Jahr?  30 
24. Wie viele Zaehne hat das bleibende Gebiss eienr Hauskatze?  30 
25. In Welchem Jahr starb Mahatma Gandhi?   1948 
26. Wie hoch kann eine Fichte warden?   60m 
27. Was ist die hoechste Temperatur die in den USA gemessen  
28. Wie lang kann eine Bachforelle am höchstens werden?  40 cm  
29. Eine normale Spitzmaus wiegt 30 Gramm. 
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30. Ein Elefant kann 75 Jahre alt werden. 
31. Ein normales Skateboard ist 65 Zentimeter lang. 
32. Ein Liter Meerwasser enthält 40 Gramm Salz. 
33. Der Schwanz eines Eichhörnchens ist 20 Zentimeter lang. 
34. Der älteste Esel aller Zeiten wurde 54 Jahre alt. 
35. Ein Tiger nimmt 18 Kilogramm Nahrung zu sich. 
36. Ein Elefant ist 21 Monate schwanger. 
37. Die Grenze zwischen Deutschland und Dänemark ist 67 Kilometer lang. 
38. Ein Klavier hat 88 Tasten. 
39. Die längste Zeit, die eine Königin je regiert hat, ist 63 Jahre. 
40. Die größte Kaugummiblase war im Durchmesser 58 Zentimeter groß. 
41. Die Körpertemperatur von Vögeln beträgt 42 Grad Celsius. 
42. Eine Biene kann eine Strecke von 18 Kilometer in der Stunde fliegen. 
43. Der längste Eisenbahntunnel der Welt ist 54 Kilometer lang. 
44. Die menschliche Hand besteht aus 18 Knochen. 
45. Die Erde legt in 3 Sekunden eine Strecke von 91 Kilometern zurück. 
46. Es gibt 54 verschiedene Känguruarten. 
47. Ein normaler Marsriegel wiegt 54 Gramm. 
48. Ein Bobbycar ist 60 Zentimeter lang. 
49. In einer 1-Liter-Flasche Coca Cola sind 36 Stück Würfelzucker. 
50. Das Herz des Vogels Strauß schlägt 65 mal pro Minute. 
51. Eine Buche kann 40 Meter hoch werden. 
52. Die schnellste Weltumsegelung dauerte 73 Tage. 
53. Seepferdchen können in einer Stunde 15 Meter zurücklegen. 
54. Ein Feuerwehrlöschzug besteht aus 22 Feuerwehrleuten. 
55. Die längste Zeit, die ein Mensch ohne Nahrung und Wasser überlebte, war 18 Tage. 
56. Der gesehene Kopfsalat hatte 56 Blätter. 
57. Man darf ab dem 35 Lebensjahr, Präsident der USA werden. 
58. Ein Pottwal wird 20 Meter lang. 
59. Ein erwachsener Schäferhund hat 42 Zähne. 
60. Ein Bambus kann 38 Meter hoch werden. 
61. Nach 14 Wochen ist aus einer Kaulquappe ein Frosch geworden. 
62. Ein Murmeltier wird höchstens 40 Zentimeter lang. 
63. Es sind bisher 12 Menschen auf dem Mond gelandet. 
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64. Dinosaurier sind seit 65 Millionen Jahren ausgestorben. 
65. Es gibt 53 Länder in Afrika. 
66. Ein Skorpion wird höchstens 18 Zentimeter lang. 
67. Alle drei Pippi Langstrumpf Bücher haben insgesamt 32 Kapitel. 
68. Die Drehleiter eines Feuerwehrwagens kann bis zu 30 Meter ausgefahren werden. 
69. Man kann ab 12 Jahren, Mitglied bei der Jugendfeuerwehr werden. 
70. Eine Kreuzotter kann 80 Zentimeter lang werden. 
71. In einer normalen Tube UHU befinden sich 31 Gramm Klebstoff. 
72. Der erste bemannte Flug eines Heißluftballons dauerte 25 Minuten. 
73. Wie groß ist der Durchmesser einer normalen CD? 12cm 
74. Wie lang ist die Strecke zwischen Düsseldorf und Duisburg? 34km 
75. Wie lang sind die Füße von Menschen mit einer Schuhgröße von 45? ca. 28cm 
76. Wie lang ist der Darm eines erwachsenen Menschen? Ca. 8m 
77. Wie viel Volumen hat der Aralsee zwischen 1960 und 2008 verloren? 90% 
78. Wie viele Meter über dem Meeresspiegel liegt die Ortsmitte von Hannover? 55m 
79. Bei welcher Temperatur schmilzt Phosphor? 44°C 
80. Wie hoch ist der Sauerstoffanteil in der Erdatmosphäre? Ca. 21% 
81. Wie lange hat Steve Fossett 2005 für eine Non-Stop Weltumrundung mit einem 
Flugzeug benötigt? 67 Stunden 
82. Um wie viele Prozentpunkte ist der Amerikanische Aktienindex am 28.10.1929 
(„schwarzer Montag“) gefallen? ca. 13% 
83. Wie lange war die russische Raumstation Mir in Betrieb? 15 Jahre 
84. Wir groß ist der Durchmesser eines 2€ Stücks? 26mm 
85. Welchen Ranplatz hat der international Flughaften von San Francisco auf der Liste der 
verkehrsreichsten Flughaefen der USA?   21 
86. Was ist die Rekordlaenge einer Westlichen Diamant Klapperschlange? 84 Inch 
87. Welche Flaeche bedeck Daenemark?   42 tausend km2 
88. Wie viel Saeulen hat das Parthenon?   86 
 
  
 
 
